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Effects of M&A announcements on shareholder’s value has been broadly researched area 
in past decades. However, there are inconsistent results, hardly any studies include Finn-
ish market and daily returns are most commonly used to measure abnormal returns. This 
study sheds light to the Finnish market and uses intra-day price data to capture immediate 
intra-day market reactions. 
This study focused on examining effects of M&A announcements for acquirer’s share-
holders. The data set included M&A announcements published as stock exchange releases 
with exact timestamps and stock price data with 5-minute time intervals from 2006 to 
2009 for companies listed in Helsinki Stock Exchange. The thesis focused on short-term 
returns, and event study with 10-day estimation window and 3-day event window was 
conducted for measuring intraday returns. Standardized cumulative abnormal returns 
(SCAR) was chosen as a metric for shareholder returns and statistical significance was 
examined by J2 test statistics. Additionally, effects of transaction-specific attributes on 
returns were researched by conducting a multivariate regression on 3-day SCAR. 
Acquirer’s shareholders received positive SCAR of 0.37% in 3-day event window, and 
the result was significant at 99% confidence level. The market reaction to an announce-
ment was immediate, and SCAR reached the maximum 35 minutes after announcement, 
followed by a slight negative drift. A multivariate regression on SCAR revealed that use 
of stocks as a payment method compared to cash payment yielded lower returns. This 
result was statistically significant at 95% confidence level. The study also suggested that 
vertical transactions yielded lower returns compared to horizontal transactions and target 
being a public company was a negative factor. However, these suggestions did not reach 
statistical significance. 
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Yrityskauppailmoituksien vaikutuksia omistaja-arvoon on tutkittu laajasti viime vuosi-
kymmeninä. Saadut tulokset ovat kuitenkin ristiriitaisia, tutkimukset eivät juurikaan kä-
sittele Suomen markkinoita, ja epänormaalin tuoton mittaamiseen on tyypillisesti käytetty 
päiväkohtaisia tuottoja. Tämä tutkimus valottaa tuottoja Suomen markkinoilla ja käyttää 
päivänsisäistä dataa välittömien markkinareaktioiden tarkasteluun. 
 
Tutkimus keskittyi tarkastelemaan yrityskauppailmoituksien vaikutuksia ostavan yrityk-
sen osakkeenomistajien tuottoon. Aineistona käytettiin pörssitiedotteina julkaistuja tar-
kan aikaleiman omaavia yrityskauppailmoituksia, sekä osakkeiden hintadataa 5 minuutin 
aikaintervalleilla vuosina 2006-2009 Helsingin pörssiin listatuille yhtiöille. Lyhyen aika-
välin tuotot olivat tarkastelun kohteena, ja tuottojen tarkasteluun käytettiin tapahtumatut-
kimusta 10 päivän estimointi-ikkunalla ja 3 päivän tapahtumaikkunalla. Tuottojen met-
riikaksi valittiin standardoitu kumulatiivinen epänormaali tuotto ja tilastollista merkit-
sevyyttä mitattiin J2 testisuureella. Lisäksi tutkittiin transaktiokohtaisten tekijöiden vai-
kutusta tuottoon toteuttamalla monimuuttujaregressio, jonka selitettävänä muuttujana oli 
standardoitu kumulatiivinen epänormaali tuotto 3 päivän aikaikkunassa. 
 
Ostavan yrityksen osakkeenomistajat saivat positiivisen 0.37% standardoidun kumulatii-
visen epänormaalin tuoton 3 päivän aikaikkunassa, ja tulos oli tilastollisesti merkitsevä 
99%:n merkitsevyystasolla. Yrityskauppailmoitus sai aikaan välittömän markkinareak-
tion, standardoidun kumulatiivisen epänormaalin tuoton maksimi saavutettiin 35 minuut-
tia ilmoituksen jälkeen, jota seurasi vähäinen lasku. Monimuuttujaregression tuloksena 
osakkeiden käyttäminen maksuvälineenä aikaansai negatiivisen standardoidun kumula-
tiivisen epänormaalin tuoton verrattuna käteisellä maksettuihin transaktioihin. Tämä tulos 
oli tilastollisesti merkitsevä 95%:n merkitsevyystasolla. Vertikaaliset transaktiot tuottivat 
heikommin verrattuna horisontaalisiin transaktioihin, ja julkinen yhtiö ostokohteena oli 
vaikutukseltaan negatiivinen. Nämä tulokset eivät olleet kuitenkaan tilastollisesti merkit-
seviä. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides background for M&A studies, briefly discusses earlier studies on 
the topic, describes the study questions and research methodology, illustrates M&A trans-
action process and presents the contents of following chapters.  
1.1 Background and earlier research 
Mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) are a tool for companies to look for growth, econo-
mies of scale, synergies and diversification. In 2006 global M&A deal value was 3.9 tril-
lion $, approximately 5% of global GDP (Christerna et al., 2017). Even though M&A 
may result to significant value creation for shareholders, there are also several reasons 
why M&A can fail and destroy value instead of creating it.  
Effects of M&A announcements on shareholder’s value has been broadly researched area 
in past decades. In this thesis M&A studies on shareholder’s value are divided to the 
following five categories: 
• General 
• Cross-border 
• Target’s legal form 
• Target’s positioning in value chain 
• Payment method 
Some of the studies are could be described as general studies, which aim to determine the 
impact of announcement effect on acquirer’s or target’s shareholders returns, or combined 
returns. For example, Alexandridis et al. (2012) researched domestic deals in US markets 
from 2003 to late-2007 and reported negative returns for acquirer’s shareholders. Ma et 
al. (2009) examined returns in Asia and found positive returns.  
One angle is to research cross-border transactions. On one hand, there are some difficul-
ties in cross-border transactions, such as cultural integration, which may affect the returns. 
On the other hand, another common idea state that higher level of corporate governance 
leads to higher returns, and thus M&A returns effected by proportional level of a corpo-
rate governance in acquirer’s and target’s home country (Martynova and Renneboog, 
2008). Wübben (2007) concentrated on German acquirers executing domestic deals and 
cross-border deals in Europe and the US and reported positive returns in domestic deals, 
and negative returns for cross-border transactions.  
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Legal form of a target is a commonly researched factor of M&A performance. Theories 
related to legal form of the target rely on valuation and asymmetric information-based 
frameworks. It is suggested that on average acquirers get better price on private compa-
nies, and this is explained by illiquidity. (Fuller et al., 2002) Capron and Shen (2005) 
reported positive returns for acquirer when target was a private company and negative 
return when target was a public company. Fuller et al. (2002) shown similar results.  
Transactions can be categorized to horizontal, vertical and conglomerate transactions 
based on positioning of target in relation to acquirer in value chain. In horizontal mergers 
two companies are competitors and synergies are achieved by combining two companies. 
(Wübben, 2007) From this perspective it could be argued that horizontal transactions 
yield to higher returns compared to two other type of transactions. Bris and Cabolis (2004) 
reported negative returns for non-horizontal mergers, and Fan & Goyal (2006) found pos-
itive returns for horizontal and vertical transactions compared to total sample. 
Payment method is one of the most researched areas of M&A transactions. It can be seen 
as a one of significant general characteristics of a transaction. Typical studies compare 
impact of use of cash, use of stocks or a combination of stocks and cash as a payment 
method. For example, Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) reported that transactions paid with 
stocks performed worst, and Loughran & Anand (1997) showed similar results.  
M&A process 
M&A process can be divided to three different main phases: pre-transaction phase, trans-
action phase, and post transaction phase (Bösecke, 2009). Overview of transaction pro-
cess can be seen below: 
 
Figure 1. Overview of M&A transaction process (Bösecke, 2009; Rosenbaum and Pearl, 
2009; Caiazza and Volpe, 2015). 
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There are several reasons for companies to look for M&A. One reason is to accelerate 
growth, as sales growth rate is typically significantly higher when executing M&A trans-
action compared to organic growth. A company can expand to new geographic areas by 
acquisition or expand vertically in the value chain. Second main rationale for M&A is 
cost synergies, as combined company can restructure its resources, and achieve cost sav-
ings. (Bösecke, 2009) When the decision to make an acquisition is done, acquiring com-
pany starts preparation of a transaction. Main parts of preparation phase are strategic 
planning and selection of transaction candidates. M&A strategy must be aligned with 
overall strategy of a company, including for example decisions of growth rate, geograph-
ical presence and broadness of operations relative to value chain. Transaction candidates 
selection includes observes potential candidates, gathering and screening information 
about the observed companies and analyzing results of potential transaction. (Meckl, 
2004) This work is typically done by designated traction team, company management and 
potentially external financial advisor. (Iannotta, 2010) 
Transaction phase requires most of the resources in a transaction process and is executed 
typically according to predetermined process schedule. Wangerin (2011) has categorized 
due diligence process to 5 different outcomes, which are:   
1. Deal premiums paid 
2. Post-acquisition performance 
3. Long term equity returns 
4. Measurement of assets and liabilities 
5. Likelihood of future goodwill impairment 
As can be seen from the list above, due diligence focuses on financial rationale and risks 
of a transaction. Another approach is to categorize due diligence process based on spe-
cialties of different advisors, for example to financial, commercial, legal and technical 
steam of due diligence. (Wangerin, 2011) 
Valuation is typically based on actual financial performance of a company, and estima-
tions of financial performance in future. Most typical valuation methods are comparable 
companies analysis, precedent transaction analysis, discounted cash flow analysis. Com-
parable companies analysis is based on the idea that similar companies trade at similar 
price levels. Similar peer group companies are selected criteria such as industry sector, 
products and services, customers, company size, profitability and geography. Trading 
multiples, for example EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT and P/E are defined and valuation is based 
on these multiples. Precedent transactions analysis is similar to comparable companies 
analysis, but current market information (stock prices) are replaced by multiples of his-
torical precedent transactions. Discounted cash flow analysis is based on estimation of 
future financial performance of the company. Free cash flow per each year is determined 
and cash flows are discounted to present value. Because estimations about distant future 
are often inaccurate, cash flows are typically estimated for 5-10 years and cash flow after 
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that are replaced with terminal value. Unlike comparable companies and precedent trans-
action analysis are market based, discounted cash flow analysis captures intrinsic value 
of the company. (Rosenbaum and Pearl, 2009)  
Negotiations and preparations are closely linked together. Negation schedule varies from 
transaction to another, but the main idea is that as process goes forward, level of details 
shifts from general to more specific, and level of available information increases. Legal 
documents include confidentiality agreements, non-disclosure agreements, letters of in-
tent and sales and purchase agreements. (Bösecke, 2009) Transaction structuring includes 
for example defining the acquiring entity and corporate structure which is used to imple-
ment transaction. Financing package is concerning both acquirer and seller, typically ac-
quirer analyses financial structure of equity and debt to be used, and in some cases, seller 
prepares for example bank debt to be used to fund the transaction. (Wangerin, 2011)  
Typically, transaction is paid in a closing event. After closing starts combining of two 
companies. Most often integration focuses on organizational, cultural and legal aspects. 
After integration phase business turns to routine management. (Bösecke, 2009) Chal-
lenges of integration are typically shutting down duplicate operations of two companies, 
getting economies of scale, and combining capabilities, technology, and intellectual cap-
ital. (Caiazza and Volpe, 2015) 
1.2 Study questions and research methodology 
There are inconsistent results about effects of M&A announcements on acquirer’s share-
holder value. Some of the studies suggest that effect is slightly positive, and some on 
contrary report slightly negative returns. Thus, the main question in this is study is set as 
follows: 
• How do M&A announcements effect on acquirer’s shareholders returns? 
In addition to capturing the returns, earlier studies have tried to explain returns by several 
factors, again, with inconsistent results. Based on this, second study question is: 
• How do transaction-specific characteristics effect on acquirer’s shareholders re-
turns?   
The availability of intra-day stock price data set an opportunity to conduct a research on 
short term returns. Event study methodology has been in a variety of study fields, such as 
finance, accounting, economics and law (MacKinlay, 1997). Event study is described to 
be a common practice when conducting a study based on stock price returns (Krivin et 
al., 2003). Additionally, event study methodology has been applied successfully when 
utilizing intra-day data, for example, Velassquez et al. (2016) used it to determine effects 
of layoffs announcements. For these reasons it was natural to select event study as a re-
search methodology.   
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The data set included M&A announcements published as stock exchange releases and 
stock price data for companies listed in Helsinki Stock Exchange. Event study methodol-
ogy was applied by first determining event window for capturing normal market returns 
and estimation window for calculation of abnormal returns of an event. These metrics of 
each announcement were aggregated to the level of whole sample. Secondly, effects of 
announcement-specific characteristics on returns were researched by conducting a multi-
variate regression to explain returns. 
Constrains of event study methodology are related to data. Maybe there is not a propriate 
amount of sufficient observations available, and there may be some errors in data. Sec-
ondly, event study methodology assumes assumption of efficient markets (Fama, 1970) 
to hold, which is not necessarily the case.   
1.3 Contents 
In second chapter a literature review and theoretical background are presented. Sections 
2.1-2.5 present results in earlier studies and describes theories relating to them. Sections 
2.6-2.9 are theoretical in nature. They do not provide results of earlier studies, but they 
are rather providing background information. Firstly, general studies on M&A are pre-
sented. Secondly, cross-border studies and related theories are gone through. Third sec-
tion describes studies and theories on public and private target studies, fourth section 
presents studies on different transaction types and fifth section focuses on payment 
method studies. End of the second chapter presents M&A value creation theories, signal-
ing effect and market efficiency. 
Third chapter describes M&A market environment by presenting M&A activity and de-
velopment of key macroeconomic drivers. Fourth chapter presents the data set used in 
this thesis. Announcement data and stock price data are described. Study hypothesis are 
formalized, and study methodology is gone through in fifth chapter. Sixth chapter pre-
sents the results and seventh chapter concludes. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL 
BACKGROUND 
When researching effect of M&A on shareholder value, it is essential to understand key 
concepts of theoretical background. In the second chapter scope is to present key concepts 
relating to value creation and to report study results from previous studies. The focus is 
on short term event studies on M&A announcement effect on acquirer’s shareholder 
value. Results on target shareholder values are shown in tables for illustrative purposes, 
but those results are not furtherly discussed. Positive, negative and mixed short-term ac-
quirer returns are reported in the studies, and target returns are reported to be positive 
with no exception. In this thesis different branches of M&A studies are categorized as 
follows: Cross-border transactions, transaction types and payment method studies are 
gone through in specific sections, and other studies are presented in this general studies 
chapter. 
2.1 General studies 
This section sheds light general studies on M&A effect on shareholder value. Some of 
the studies have focused for example on merger waves and valuation. The following table 
summarizes general studies on M&A shareholder value. Acquirer returns are presented 
first, beginning from recent studies to oldest and target returns follows. Target returns are 
presented for illustrative purposes in the table and they are not furtherly discussed. Sum-
marizing tables that follow in this chapter are constructed in similar manner.  
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Table 1. Summary of general studies on M&A shareholder value. 
 
Alexandridis et al. (2012) a merger wave starting in 2003 lasted to late-2007 by examin-
ing domestic US deals. They reported mean cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of -
1.50% in 3 days event window and CARs of -2.05% in 21-day event window for acquirer. 
Cash transactions had slightly positive CARs. It was also noted that the observation pe-
riod was characterized by less overvalued targets and cash was used often as a payment 
method. Martynova and Renneboog (2008b) also noted that different waves are charac-
terized by different attributes. Moeller et al. (2005) found negative CARs for US M&A 
announcements and pointed out that losses where much larger on the time period from 
1998 to 2001 compared to 1980s, pointing out the differences of different periods. 
Andrade et al. (2001) reported acquirer returns of -0.3%, -0.4%, -1.0% and -0.7% for 
periods of 1973-79, 1980-89, 1990-88 and 1973-98. This study was also executed for U.S 
data: companies were listed in New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange 
and Nasdaq. Mulherin and Boone (2000) used the same sources of data for U.S firms for 
time period from 1990 to 1999 and reported -0.37% CARs for acquirer. Thus, the results 
are very similar with the study of Andrade et al. Schwert (1996) reported also negative 
CARs for the US companies, however, the study was examining long term returns.  
Ma et al. (2009) examined M&A returns in Asia. They reported mean CARs of 0.96%, 
1.28% and 1.70% for event windows of (0,1), (-1,1) and (-2, +2). These findings are an 
example of insignificance of minor changes in event window – results are consistent with 
each event window setup. Yearly CARs were negative in 8 cases out of 60 observations, 
Author Year Role Return
Alexandridis 2011 Acquirer Negative
Ma et al. 2009 Acquirer Positive
Martynova & Renneboog 2007 Acquirer Mixed
Moeller et al. 2005 Acquirer Negative
Goergen & Rennebook 2002 Acquirer Positive 
Andrade & Mitchell 2001 Acquirer Negative
Mulherin & Boone 2000 Acquirer Negative
Schwert 1996 Acquirer Negative
Bradley et al. 1988 Acquirer Positive
Jensen 1984 Acquirer Mixed
Akipudos 2011 Target Positive
Bösecke 2009 Target Positive
Martynova & Renneboog 2007 Target Positive
Andrade & Mitchell 2001 Target Positive
Mulherin & Boone 2000 Target Positive
Bradley et al. 1988 Target Positive
Eckbo 1986 Target Positive
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yearly CARs were reported for 10 companies from 2000 to 2005. This study also sug-
gested that there is leakage of information as days -1 and -2 have also statistically signif-
icant positive CARs. Georgen and Renneboog (2002) reported 0.7% positive CAR for 
European transactions. This result is very similar to findings of Ma et al. in Asian envi-
ronment. Mulherin and Boone (2000) reported 0.79% CAR for 10 days event window, 
however, power of the test was greater with event window from -5 to +20, producing 
CAR of 1.70%. The research shed light also to competition of bidder in transaction pro-
cess and noted that returns are decreased as number of bidders increase.  
2.2 Cross-border transactions 
Cross-border M&A is a tool for companies aiming for strategic expansion. Globalization 
has increased number of international transactions. Fifth merger wave in 1990s was a 
period of international M&A, and acquisitions in 1997 alone exceeded transaction value 
in 1980s (Hitt, 2001; see also Shimizu et al., 2004). International transactions have been 
studied from three perspectives, as a tool of market entry, learning process, and finally, 
from perspective of value creation. Transaction is typically categorized as cross-border 
transaction, if headquarters of bidder and target are located in different countries. How-
ever, same challenges of for example cultural integration occur in domestic transaction, 
if participants have operations located abroad. (Shimizu et al., 2004) Vice versa, head-
quarters can be located in different counties, but operations are mainly located in same 
countries, and thus characteristics of the transactions are more comparable to domestic 
M&A.  
Majority of M&A studies have focused on US and UK, and scope has been on domestic 
transactions. As an example, Georgen and Renneboog (2002) published Europe-wide 
M&A study focusing also on value creation of cross-border transactions. Different tax 
treatment in foreign countries is suggested to be motivator for international M&A. Also, 
companies with international operations may exploit exchange rate movements by mov-
ing operations. (Georgen and Renneboog, 2002) 
Corporate governance can be defined as a controls, regulations, and incentives created to 
prevent fraud. (Berk and DeMarzo Peter, 2011) Level of corporate governance varies 
between different companies, industries, and countries. In international M&A content 
corporate governance is in an essential role related to value creation for shareholders of 
bidder and target. Three key hypotheses on corporate governance are presented in the 
table below:  
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Table 2. Three hypotheses on corporate governance in cross-border M&A (Martynova 
and Renneboog, 2008b) 
 
Full takeover in cross-border transaction results to change of nationality. When compa-
nies are merged, combined entity will start to apply corporate governance of the bidder 
company. If corporate governance in the home country of bidding company is on higher 
level than target company’s home country, outcome will be higher level of corporate gov-
ernance for merged company. Thus, value is created for target and bidder shareholders. 
Negative spillover by law hypotheses is same phenomena as opposite: Bidding company 
is exposed to more limited corporate governance, and this level will be applied to merged 
company. Total outcome is negative in terms of shareholders value creation, because level 
of corporate governance of merged company is lower. Finally, bootstrapping theory sug-
gests that in some cases bidder starts to apply stricter corporate governance than it should. 
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2008b) If company management is assumed to maximize 
shareholder value, it will increase level of corporate governance applied in company over 
the level required by law, if it is assumed to lead higher valuation for the company shares. 
Table 3 summarizes studies of cross-border transactions.  
Table 3. Summary of international M&A -related studies on shareholder return. 
 
Yilmaz and Tanyeri (2016) studied 253,461 transactions globally. Positive CAR of 1.4% 
was reported for the acquirer. It was also found that both, acquirers and targets, received 
higher CARs in emerging markets compared to transactions in developed countries. 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008b) reported 0.57% CAR for acquirer in cross-border 
deals in 3 days event window, and 0.83% CAR for domestic M&A transactions. Same 
metrics for targets were 12.55% and 11.52%. Wübben (2007) concentrated on German 
Hypotesis Description
Positive spillover by law Better corporate governance is applied to the 
bidder compared to the targer
Negative spillover by law Worse corporate governance is applied to the 
bidder compared to the targer
Bootstrapping Bidder voluntarily chooces to apply higher level 
of corporate governance
Author Year Role Return
Yilmaz & Tanyeri 2016 Acquirer Positive
Martynova & Renneboog 2008 Acquirer Positive
Wubben 2007 Acquirer Mixed
Georgen & Renneboog 2004 Acquirer Positive
Bris & Cabolis 2004 Acquirer Negative
Yilmaz & Tanyeri 2016 Target Positive
Martynova & Renneboog 2008 Target Positive
Georgen & Renneboog 2004 Target Positive
Bris & Cabolis 2004 Target Positive
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acquirers executing domestic deals and cross-border deals in Europe and the US. In 3 
days event window CAR of 0.63% was reported for domestic German deals, and negative 
CAR of -0.18% was reported for German acquirers in European cross-border transac-
tions. Georgen and Renneboog (2004) found 0.7% CAR for acquirers and 9% CAR for 
targets in total sample in European deals. -0.1% CAR was reported for acquirers in event 
window of 5 days in domestic deals, and 3.01% for acquirers in cross-border deals. These 
results are somewhat inconsistent with typical cross-border studies, which indicate higher 
returns for domestic deals. Bris and Cabolis (2004) studied international transaction from 
the point of view of investor protection. They reported approximately -4% CAR for ac-
quirer in cross-border transaction, and CAR for domestic acquirer was -6%. Major finding 
of this study was that the better shareholder regulation in acquirer’s origin country yields 
higher profits for the acquirer. 
2.3 Public and private target studies 
The target of an acquisition can be either public company or privatively held company. 
Research suggests that transactions on private targets yield to positive abnormal return 
for acquirer (Officer et al.  2009, see also Chang 1998, Fuller at al. 2002, Moeller et al. 
2004, Faccio et al. 2006) Legal form of a target is a commonly researched factor of M&A 
performance. Theories related to legal form of the target rely on valuation and asymmetric 
information-based frameworks. It is suggested that on average acquirers get better price 
on private companies, and this is explained by illiquidity. Private companies are not as 
liquid as publicly traded companies, resulting to illiquidity discount. It is also suggested 
that use of stock as a payment method for private target will result for higher returns, 
because new owners who received stocks are in good position to monitor the acquirer and 
are willing to pay more. (Fuller et al., 2002)  
Table 4. Summary of public and private target -related studies on shareholder return. 
 
Officer et al. (2009) reported 3.8% CAR for acquirers where target was a private company 
from 1995 to 2004 observation period. The median was 2.4%, and high losses were con-
centrated on few large deals. This result is compared to previous studies, which report 
significantly lower CARs for acquirers, and no empirical evidence on public targets is 
presented. Martynova and Renneboog (2008b) tested target’s legal type as an explanatory 
in an international context and reported CARs between -0.77% and -0.34% for acquirer 
Author Year Role Return
Officer et al. 2008 Acquirer Mixed
Martynova and Renneboog 2008 Acquirer Positive
Capron & Shen 2005 Acquirer Mixed
Fuller et al. 2002 Acquirer Mixed
Chang 1998 Acquirer Mixed
Martynova and Renneboog 2008 Target Positive
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in several different model specifications. Capron and Shen (2005) found approximately 
+4% CAR for acquirer in event window from -20 to +10 days when acquirer a private 
company and return for public target transactions was -1%. They also implemented a 
survey and found that if there was not enough information to valuate private target’s as-
sets, deal was not likely to occur based on information asymmetry between acquirer and 
target. Fuller et al. (2002) reported CARs of 2.11% for private targets and -1.07% for 
public targets. Private targets purchased with cash yielded 2.47% CARs, as Fuller et al. 
suggested as a hypothesis. Used event window length was 2 days. Chang (1998) reported 
0.09% CAR for private targets acquired by cash, and 2.64% for private target transactions 
acquired by stocks. Equivalent metrics for public target transactions were -0.02% and -
2.46%.   
2.4 Different transactions types  
After understanding the transaction process, it is essential to make distinction between 
different kind of transaction. Theories on shareholder value of mergers and acquisitions 
rely partly on transaction type. Transactions can be categorized by their technical nature 
to mergers and acquisitions, by value chain positioning to vertical, horizontal and con-
glomerate transaction, and by target board role to friendly and hostile transactions.   
2.4.1 Merger & acquisition 
Merger and acquisition as terms arise often confusion. Merger is a combination of two 
companies, where assets and liabilities of the target company are absorbed by the byer 
company. The byer company remains as a same legal entity after the merger. (Sherman, 
2010) An example of merger is merger of two Finnish construction companies, YIT and 
Lemminkäinen. YIT published in June 2017 an offer of 3.6146 new YIT shares for each 
of Lemminkäinen, resulting that after the merger YIT shareholders will own 60% and 
Lemminkäinen 40% of the combined company after the merger. (YIT, 2017) Structure of 
the transaction:  
        
Figure 2. Structure of YIT-Lemminkäinen merger (YIT, 2017) 
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YIT issued new shares to buy for Lemminkäinen’s shares. This kind of transaction is 
called stock swap. Another common payment method is cash. Additionally, acquire may 
use for example debt instruments and options. If cash is used as a payment method, pay-
ment will generate tax liability for target shareholders. In stock swap tax liability will be 
generated in future, when target shareholders sell their stocks that were received in trans-
action. (Berk and DeMarzo Peter, 2011)  
In acquisition, buyer acquires an asset, for example a machine, a plant, a division, or 
entire company. (Sherman, 2010) For example, Konecranes, a Finnish crane manufac-
turer, acquired Material Handling & Port Solutions of Terex Corporation, US-based 
global manufacturing company. Konecranes created new stock series with some re-
strictions to pay for this acquisition, and as a part of the transaction, Terex will have right 
to appoint to Konecranes board members. (Konecranes, 2016) Unlike in acquisition, 
Terex will remain as a legal entity.  
Terms merger and acquisition are typically used together, because often net result is often 
identical. Two companies operating together will end up to becoming one. In stock pur-
chase, acquired company may operate on its’ own as a subsidiary or division. (Sherman, 
2010) In this thesis acquisition refers to all acquisitions that are published by stock ex-
change release, as discussed in chapter 5. No distinction between different targets are 
made, so target universe includes for example plants, divisions and companies.   
2.4.2  Horizontal, vertical & conglomerate merger 
If target company is in same industry as acquirer, merger is typically called as horizontal 
merger. In vertical merger the target is positioned before or after the acquirer in value 
chain. Conglomerate merger refers to transaction, where target operates in different in-
dustry than the acquirer (Berk and DeMarzo Peter, 2011) Another factors categorizing 
merger types are products and technologies of target and acquirer (Wübben, 2007) Mer-
ger type segmentation by markets and products: 
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Table 5. Merger types categorized by market and products (Wübben, 2007). 
 
In horizontal merger two competitors are combined, and rationale is often based on econ-
omies of scale and synergies. Synergy potential is significant, because two companies 
have similar operations. If acquirer stays in the same market but acquires new technology 
by a transaction, the deal can be categorized as market-concentric. (Wübben, 2007) YIT-
Lemminkäinen transaction described above is an example of horizontal transaction, as 
both companies are operating in Finnish construction markets with relatively similar of-
ferings.  
Merger is categorized as vertical, if target is positioned below or above bidder in value 
chain, in other words, target is supplier or customer of the acquirer (Wübben, 2007). Idea 
in vertical integration is that management will have control over larger part of supply 
chain, and efficiency gains are achieved. (Berk and DeMarzo Peter, 2011) It is suggested 
that vertical mergers increase collusion between competitors and create higher barriers to 
enter a market. (Comanor and Rey, 2004) Oil industry is classical example of vertical 
integration, as same company might operate in oil production, refinery, and sales of gas-
oline. (Berk and DeMarzo Peter, 2011) 
In technology-concentric merger target and acquirer are offering same products but are 
operating in different markets. Entering a new market may be easier by transaction, com-
pared to extending existing operations. (Wübben, 2007) In conglomerate deal acquirer 
operates in different market with different products and technology compared to the tar-
get. Private equity transactions are an example of conglomerate deals. Value creation is 
harder to achieve in conglomerate deals because synergies cannot be achieved, and thus 
another factors are essential in private equity deal. (Berk and DeMarzo Peter, 2011) Char-
acteristic of a good target for private equity company are strong cash flow, stable market 
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position, revenue growth, efficiency improvement opportunities, low capital expenditure, 
strong asset base, and talented management team (Rosenbaum and Pearl, 2009) 
Wübben (2007) reported that non-related transactions (vertical and conglomerate) yielded 
higher returns compared to horizontal transactions, as non-related transactions had 1.99% 
CAR in 3-days event window and CAR for horizontal transactions was 0.27%. When 
horizontal transactions were specified into sub-categories, result was that when acquirer 
and target were closer to each other business-wise, the CARs increased. Fan and Goyal 
(2006) suggested that vertical and horizontal mergers generate equally positive wealth 
effects and are more profitable than conglomerate mergers. The study reported 2.5% com-
bined CAR for acquirer and target for vertical mergers, and analogous metric for total 
sample was 1.9%. However results for acquirer wealth effects were not presented. Bris 
and Cabolis (2004) reported minus-signed coefficient for non-horizontal mergers, how-
ever, without statistical significance. Non-horizontal returns appeared to be higher in 
cross-border deals compared to domestic transactions. Eckbo (1983) researched merger 
proposals and antitrust complaints announcements and announcement effects on rivals in 
the same industry. Eckbo reported statistically significant positive CAR for horizontal 
mergers, vertical transactions CAR was also positive-signed but no statistically meaning-
ful. To conclude, there are inconsistent results about the effects of vertical, horizontal and 
conglomerate mergers. However, most presented result is that horizontal merger yields 
higher returns compared to non-horizontal mergers.   
2.4.3 Friendly & hostile takeover 
Board of directors of both companies need to approve a merger. Depending on the great-
ness of the impact, transaction may need also shareholder approval in general meeting. In 
a friendly takeover, the acquirer contacts target board and achieves board approval to the 
transaction. Target board negotiates with acquirer and potential other acquirers and agrees 
on the price that is offered for the target. After approval, transaction conditions and price 
are presented to the shareholder for voting purposes. (Berk and DeMarzo Peter, 2011) 
In hostile takeover, target’s board and senior management do not agree with the transac-
tion and they try to prevent it. (Berk and DeMarzo Peter, 2011) Situation may end up to 
a proxy fight, where target board and potential acquirer try to collect enough proxies from 
shareholders, to get their suggestion approved. Hostile takeover is often facilitated by a 
tender offer. In tender offer potential acquirer publishes an offer for all target sharehold-
ers. (Ross, Westerfield and Jordan, 2010) It is suggested that a tender offer leads often to 
auction-like process to generate several competitive bids, and thus leading to higher pre-
mium offered for the target stocks. (Wübben, 2007) Potential acquirer has also alternative 
to purchase target stocks from markets, in order to have more votes (Berk and DeMarzo 
Peter, 2011)  
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An example of a tender offer is a case where Investors House, a Finnish real estate com-
pany published a tender offer in August 2017 in order to purchase stocks of Orava Resi-
dential Reit, a Finnish real estate fund. 2 Investors House shares and 0.21EUR cash was 
offered for 3 Orava Residential REIT shares. (Investors House, 2017) Thus, the offer was 
a combination of cash and stocks. The Board of Directors of Orava Residential REIT 
published an intention to seek for other alternatives for the tender offer (Orava Residential 
REIT, 2017) It was published in September 2017 that Elite Varainhoito Oyj made com-
petitive offer (Orava Residential REIT 2, 2017) In October 2017 Orava Funds plc, man-
agement company of Orava Residential REIT, made third competitive bid (Orava 
Residential REIT 3, 2017) Initial tender offer generated 2 alternative suggestions. First 
offer made by Investors House was most successful and Investors House gained owner-
ship of 25.2 % of Orava Residential REIT plc’s share and votes (OravaResidentialREIT 
4, 2017)  
Holderness and Sheehan (1985) presented three theories related to hostile takeovers. 
Study concentrated on so called corporate riders, who aim to profit themselves by captur-
ing value from other shareholders. Term rider is used for bidding company which is as-
sume to gain control to the company, pillage it, and leave only shell of the company left 
(Jensen, 1984) Three theories of corporate riders are presented below:  
Table 6. Hypothesis on corporate raiders (Holderness and Sheehan, 1985). 
 
Raiding hypothesis argues that some strong market players have ability to access corpo-
rate control and to create value by benefiting from other stockholders. Theoretically this 
conclusion is not valid, because if it becomes possible that one stockholder is preparing 
to buy 51% or more of the stocks, other stakeholders would react by preparing their own 
bid. Thus, market mechanism would make raiding unprofitable. Empirical evidence is 
also against raiding hypothesis. If we assume that some identified raiders (For example, 
Sheehan and Holderness focus their empirical study on 6 investors known for their cor-
porate raiding behavior: Carl Icahn, Irwin Jacobs, Carl Lindner, David Murdock, Victor 
Posner, and Charles Bluhdorn) have benefitted so that they benefited from other stock-
holders, stock price would go down when it is announced that a raider have starter to buy 
a certain company. (Holderness and Sheehan, 1985) Typically a flagging notification 
must be published if ownership of a stockholder exceeds a threshold. However, event day 
returns were actually higher (+1.8%) if raider made a flagging notification, compared to 
average flagging notification (+0.4%).  
Hypothesis Description Effect on value 
Raiding 
hypothesis
Raider gains access to corportate assets by 
benefiting from other shareholders Positive
Management 
hypothesis
Raider has the ability to improve target 
management Positive
Analysis 
hypothesis
Raider has superior analysing skills and only 
undervalued stocks are acquired Positive
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Improved management hypothesis relies on the idea that a corporate rider has skills to 
improve target management. Two main activities for corporate riders are identified: 
1) Change of corporate personnel (for example CEO) 
2) Change of corporate policy (for example preventing acquisition which was earlier 
approved) (Holderness and Sheehan, 1985) 
Empirical evidence is in line with management hypothesis. Introduced management team 
chances are resulted with positive wealth gains for announcement day (+13.0%), whereas 
withdrawn management team changes had negative announcement day wealth effect (-
3.4%) (Holderness and Sheehan, 1985) Is discussed earlier, flagging notification from 
known corporate rider resulted to positive return for announcement day. This could be 
explained by management hypothesis.  
Analysis hypothesis assumed that corporate rider has superior skill to analyze and identify 
undervalued stocks. This could be possible either by analyzing publicly available infor-
mation, or gaining access to insider information. (Holderness and Sheehan, 1985) This 
can be seen as a subset of valuation-based theories, which partially rely on an idea that 
bidder understand the target better than average investor. Valuation-based theories of 
merger motives are discussed in section “M&A value creation theories”.  
2.5 Payment method  
Typical payment methods for transactions are cash, equity, or combination of cash and 
equity. Also, debt and for example options can be used as a payment method, however, 
most of the theories are concentrating on the choice between cash and equity. There are 
several factors that are affecting on the financing method of a transaction: 
• Taxation 
• Wealth transfer 
• Tax efficiency of internal financing (Bruner, 1988) 
• Liquidity (Berk and DeMarzo Peter, 2011) 
Modigliani and Merton (1958) argued that market value of a firm is independent of use 
of equity and debt, and there is optimal level of leverage to maximize expected return. As 
interests on debt are tax deductible items, in that sense it is beneficial for a company to 
increase level of leverage. (Modigliani and Merton, 1958; Bruner, 1988) Wealth transfer 
refers to correlation of returns of two merging companies. If correlation is not perfect, 
variance of returns of the combined company will be lower and thus lead to lower WACC. 
(Bruner, 1988) Berk and DeMarzo Peter (2011) notes that timing mismatch can be used 
to tax benefits from operative result. It is argued that acquisitions and internal financing 
are more effective use of excessive cash compared to dividends and stock buybacks from 
the personal taxation point of view. Liquidity of bidder company stock is also one aspect 
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determining how much equity will be used as a funding. Low liquidity will pose a risk 
for target. On contrary, if target is a private company, taking a shift from private stocks 
to public stocks will offer a way to realize holdings in future. (Berk and DeMarzo Peter, 
2011) In empirical research several other factors, such as nationality and existence of 
competing bids have influence in financing decision. (Fischer, 2017)  
Transactions that are financed with equity are expected to result to lower results for bidder 
shareholders compared to cash offer. It is beneficial for bidder to use equity as a payment 
method, if management considers stock overvalued. Thus, market reaction should be neg-
ative. On the contrary, use of cash should lead to positive market reaction, as bidder stock 
is not considered overvalued. If debt financing is needed in addition to generated cash, 
typical way to raise debt is from a bank. Banks are considered capable evaluators for a 
transaction, and it be argued, that banks gives financing only for reasonable transactions. 
Thus, use of debt will also trigger positive reaction. (Martynova and Renneboog, 2009)  
Payment method studies 
Payment method is one of the most researched areas of M&A transactions. It can be seen 
as a one of significant general characteristics of a transaction. Next table summarizes 
studies that focus on payment method.  
Table 7. Summary of payment method -related studies on shareholder return. 
 
Acquirer returns are reported to be positive in three studies, negative in one, and two 
studies reported negative returns for acquirers. Thus, results in the payment method re-
search are inconsistent. Fischer (2017) examined different financing sources and their 
short-term effect on shareholder value. He found that debt-financed transactions yielded 
larger stock returns compared to transactions financed by stock issues. The study reported 
2.15% short-term abnormal returns for fully credit-financed transactions (1% significance 
level), -0.92% for stock issues (statistically insignificant), -0.05% for debt-issues (statis-
tically insignificant), and 1.22% for use of internal funds 10% significance level). Fischer 
(2017) argued that abnormal returns where higher, if a bank there was a bank participating 
Author Year Role Return
Fischer 2016 Acquirer Positive
Ismail & Krause 2010 Acquirer Negative
Martynova & Renneboog 2009 Acquirer Positive
Delcoure & Hunsader 2006 Acquirer Positive
Eckbo & Thorburn 2000 Acquirer Mixed
Loughran & Anand 1997 Acquirer Mixed
Eckbo et al. 1990 Acquirer Positive
Ismail & Krause 2010 Target Positive
Martynova & Renneboog 2009 Target Positive
Delcoure & Hunsader 2006 Target Positive
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in the transaction process. Professional screening of a bank increases creditability and 
transparency of a transaction.  
Ismail and Krause (2010) reported -4.2% cumulative abnormal return for acquirer, using 
sample of publicly listed US companies between 1985 and 2004. Use of cash as a payment 
method was statistically meaningful factor of abnormal returns. Factors to determine the 
payment form were also studied. Only meaningful factor was management entrenchment: 
for example, existence of staggered boards or poison pills lead to more probable use of 
cash. It was argued that acquirer can overcome protection set by management more easily 
with cash offer. It was also found that asymmetric information, budget limits or tax issues 
did not significantly affect the selection of payment method. (Ismail and Krause, 2010) 
(Martynova and Renneboog (2009) created a study to examine both, financing decision 
and payment method. Usually studies concentrate on the payment method, and internal 
use of funds is not covered. CARs of 0.94%, 1.09%, and -0.16% were reported for cash 
payments, mixed payment and equity payment. Post announcement period in the study 
was from day 2 to day 60, and post announcement CARs of -2.21%, -4.11%, and -5.15% 
was reported. Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) reported that transactions paid with stocks per-
formed worst, however, study period was month 0, and months from 13 to 60 relative to 
the reported transaction. Loughran and Anand (1997) reported -25% CARs for stock pay-
ments and 61.7% CARs for cash payments on 5 year post acquisition period. Eckbo et al. 
(1990) found that mixed payment leads to significant positive performance on one-month 
period compared to both, only cash and only stock payments. 
2.6 Merger waves 
Merger activity has taken peaks in history, called as merger waves. In the US merger 
wave have occurred in early 1900s, the 1920s, the 1960s, the 1980s, and the 1990s. Mer-
ger waves comes as a result of economic, political, and legal changes. (Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2008a) Merger waves tend to also correlate with bull market (Berk and 
DeMarzo Peter, 2011). A Figure illustrating merger activity by plotting share of compa-
nies taken over quarterly is presented below:  
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Figure 3. Percentage taken over companies of all public companies per quarter from 
1926 to 2011 (Berk and DeMarzo Peter, 2011). 
Each of the merger waves have certain characteristics. In 1960s great portion of deals 
were conglomerate deals, and the idea was that deals managerial skills can be utilize in 
completely different industries. 1980s was golden age of hostile conglomerate deals: in-
efficient companies were acquired and sold in pieces. In 1990s globalization accelerated, 
and companies expanded to new markets, and the idea was to create companies strong 
enough to become global players. 1990s merger wave ended to dot-com bubble. (Berk 
and DeMarzo Peter, 2011) The wave was characterized with overpayment, mega-deals, 
overvaluation of acquiring companies (Alexandridis, Mavrovitis and Travlos, 2012).  
Another active period, also driven by globalization deals, started in 2003 ended to credit 
crash in late-2007 (Berk and DeMarzo Peter, 2011) The period is especially interesting 
because half of the data sample used in this thesis is included in this wave.  Sixth merger 
wave was triggered by large amount of liquidity, and deals were often explained by syn-
ergy benefits. The market was not as competitive compared to 1990s merger wave, and 
premiums payed were significantly lower. In late-2007 dealmakers began to doubt state 
of credit market and economic environment. When crisis started, financing for M&A 
deals tightened and effected significantly activity. M&A deal value peaked to more than 
$1 trillion in 2006 in the US (Alexandridis et al., 2012)  
2.7 M&A value creation theories 
There are several theories about rationale of mergers and acquisitions. They can be cate-
gorized to general, valuation, and agency problem-based theories. General theories sug-
gest positive value creation, valuation theories provide positive and negative results, and 
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agency problem -based theories suggest negative value creation. Several different phe-
nomena that are present in these theories are present in typical transactions.   
2.7.1 General theories 
Three general value creation theories are synergy, efficiency, and monopoly theory. Gen-
eral value creation theories are presented in a table below: 
Table 8. General M&A value creation theories (Berk and DeMarzo Peter, 2011). 
 
Synergies 
On one hand, merger can lead to lower price for capital, as two loan portfolios are com-
bined. Secondly, merger decreases systematic risk of company’s investment portfolio. 
Finally, third tool to achieve financial synergies is facilitation of internal capital markets 
operating on information advantage. Financial-like synergy could be also achieved by tax 
savings, as in conglomerate merger profits of one company could be off-set by losses of 
another company. Operational synergies could occur by combining for example sales or 
R&D functions as two companies merge. (Trautwein, 1990) Porter and Millar (1985) that 
information transformation between two merger functions is also a source of synergy. 
This is aligned with the technology-driven transactions described in section 2.4.2. 
Damoraran (2005) lists economies of scale, pricing power, functional strengths, and 
higher market growth as sources of operational synergies.  
Efficiency 
Efficiency synergies rely on the idea that when two companies are combined, they are 
easier to managed by same directors. Additionally, if management of a company is inef-
ficient, it can be replaced by acquirers more efficient management. Difficulty in this ap-
proach is that even if inefficient company is identified, it may be extremely challenging 
to improve performance. (Berk and DeMarzo Peter, 2011) Baker et al., (1988) note that 
company management can be more efficiently motivated, if management ownership is 
structured to a transaction. This is especially true in low growth environment, when sal-
ary-based compensation is not as effective as equity-based.  
Monopoly 
Theory Description Effect on value 
Synergies Operating and financial synergies create value Positive
Efficiency Two companies are ran more efficiently 
combined Positive
Monopoly Merger of two rivals will decrease competition 
and increase profitability Positive
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If a company merges with competitor, on one hand combined company achieves greater 
market power. On the other hand, there is less competition in the market and profits will 
increase. This phenomenon is known as monopoly theory. (Berk and DeMarzo Peter, 
2011)In synergy-based theories created value is captured by either acquirer, target, or 
both, and idea is that either total value is increased, or transaction destroys value for some 
of the transaction counterparties. This is a distinction compared to monopoly theory, 
which suggest that society as a whole will pay for value captured by acquirer and target. 
These arguments fit better for horizontal transactions. There are also several monopoly-
based reasons for conglomerate transactions identified: 
1) Companies will gain option to cross-subsidize products between different mar-
kets. If one market is greatly profitable and another is in a phase where gaining 
market share is essential, profits gained from first market can be used for market 
share increasing actions in the latter one. (Trautwein, 1990) 
2) Operating in several markets can be used to limit competition in more than on 
market. For example, a company can enter to a new market where its’ main com-
petitor is active, and thus gain better negotiation position. (Edwards, 1955; 
Trautwein, 1990) 
3) Companies can use transaction as a tool to prevent new market entrants. One ex-
ample of this behavior is a congeneric merger initiated by strong market player 
(Trautwein, 1990) 
As monopolies are not value creating for society, antitrust laws are introduced in many 
counties to prevent monopolistic mergers. Extend of government participation varies over 
county, time, and policymakers in power in transaction time. (Berk and DeMarzo Peter, 
2011) Antitrust merger control has been criticized from several points of views: control 
is anticompetitive, synergistic gains are lost by control, real motive is really protection-
ism, and they are not efficient for technological development. (Duso, Gugler and 
Yurtoglu, 2011) 
S Group, a large Finnish retail co-operative acquired Stockmann Herkku, a chain of high-
end food stores from Stockmann in 2017. Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority 
approved the transaction on a condition that Stockmann Herkku must keep same supplier, 
Tuko, to the end of 2018. S Group increased its market share in Helsinki, Tapiola, and 
Tampere, and the market share exceeded 40% in every market segment except Turku. 
This is an example of antitrust presence in merger environment. (Talouselämä, 2017) In 
this case Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority took action to act on supplier-
side, rather than on food retail market itself.    
2.7.2 Valuation-based theories 
Stock valuation is often debated subject in merger and acquisition context. Related to 
merger motives, theories can be divided to two main categories: 
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Table 9. Valuation-based theories of merger motives. 
 
Valuation based theories rely mostly on the idea that bidder has better understanding of 
the target, and thus has an advantage over average market participants (Steiner, 1976; 
Holderness and Sheehan, 1985; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Trautwein, 1990). This 
information-based advantage is referred as information asymmetry in academic publica-
tions. Asymmetric information be related to several different factors.  
1) First, only bidder has the ability to see coming synergies when two companies are 
combined.  
2) Secondly, company can be more valuable when sold in parts.  
3) Thirdly, bidder may observe that if the target’s operations are ran differently, 
value will be higher. (Trautwein, 1990) 
These hypotheses are in conflict with efficient market hypotheses presented in section 
2.9. If markets where strong-form efficient, no such information asymmetry would occur. 
On the other hand, if bidder has private information, it must be published at the same time 
with the bid. If markets are assumed to be semi-strong form efficient, markets will imme-
diately take advantage of new information and it would be reflected in the price, and no 
value is created for acquirer. (Trautwein, 1990)  
One can argue that this argumentation has too theoretic approach. In reality, the bidder 
studies multiple of possible scenarios it would end up the transaction, and after that de-
fines the price it is willing to pay. Other possible bidders go through the same process and 
end up with a valuation for the target. As full detailed strategy related to transaction is not 
revealed to other participants, there are some differences in valuations. There is always 
some private information that some market participants hold, it should be noted that not 
the target or any bidder have full information about components driving the target valua-
tion. (Wensley, 1982) Making a bid always signals information that the target is tempting 
and valuable for someone, and this increases market activity, and possible returns for the 
bidder.  
In a research conducted in 1984, 32 percent of managers of a public company thought 
that stock market valuation is justified, 60 percent kept company’s stock undervalued, 
and 2 felt that company is overvalued. On one hand, mergers are often justified by argu-
mentation based on undervaluation of the target, which can be seen in this result. On the 
other hand, overvaluation of acquirers stock is not viable on majority of cases, as only 2 
percent of managers kept the stock overvalued. (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987)   
Theory Description Effect on value 
Overvaluation Acquirers uses overvalued stock as a payment 
method
Positive
Undervaluation Target shares are undervalued Positive
23 
Majority of discussion has concentrated on value creation caused by undervaluation of 
the target. Alternative approach is to consider overvaluation of the bidder. Jensen (2004) 
suggested that stock overvaluation is a source of value destruction, and typically manag-
ers and board members do not have observed risks related to stock over valuation. Over-
valuation situation occurs when market capitalization of a company is greater than intrin-
sic value of the company. Typical form of equity overvaluation is overrated expectations 
for company’s financial performance. For example, Enron’s market value was USD 
70billion at highest, when company’s intrinsic value was around USD 30billion. This led 
management of Enron to manipulation of accounting and overstating new business lines 
of the company, in order to meet expectations of shareholders. Management behavior 
ended up to losing also the intrinsic value of the company. (Jensen, 2004)  
Similar results are also found in research of accrual behavior. Kothari et al., (2006) pre-
sented that agency theory of overvalued equity is the reason behind low accruals, as work-
ing hypothesis was that it is results on investors’ expectations on accruals. Evidence of 
value destruction can be found also from m&a contexts. Moeller et al., (2005) found ev-
idence that acquiring companies’ shareholders lost around USD 216billion from 1991 to 
2001. As a comparison, the lost was USD 4billion from 1980 to 1990, and companies 
used 6 times to transactions in the later period. The losses resulted from few highly neg-
ative value transactions, and weighted abnormal returns were positive. On the positive 
side, in the later period use of stock options became more common, and as a result man-
agers’ interest are more aligned with stockholders. Secondly, there might have been more 
operational synergies to be captured by acquirer’s shareholders by transaction. 
2.7.3 Agency problem -based theories 
Agency problem occurs when two parties have different goals and motives. First party, 
the principal, delegates duties and work for the other party, the agent. Agency theory has 
been researched in various fields of science, such as finance, marketing, political science, 
organizational behavior, and sociology. Principal-agent setup generates two problems:  
1) How to align goals and motives of the two parties? 
2) How principal can efficiently secure that the agent is performing tasks that are 
delegated? (Eisenhardt, 2017) 
From finance point of view, two agency problem related theories are relevant. These the-
ories are described in the table below:   
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Table 10. Agency problem -based theories of merger motives (Trautwein, 1990; Ross, 
Westerfield and Jordan, 2010). 
  
Whereas general (synergies, efficiency, managerial motives) and valuation-based (over-
valuation of acquirer’s stock, undervaluation of the targets stock) theories are suggesting 
that mergers create value, hubris and empire building theories suggest that mergers de-
stroy value.  
Hubris theory 
Hubris hypothesis is based on the idea of management overconfidence. If over confident 
management and efficient markets are assumed, there are three outcomes.   
1) First, managers of a company believe that their company is under-valuated as a 
risky asset in capital markets.  
2) Secondly, positive net present value projects may be rejected by overconfident 
company management.  
3) Thirdly, internal corporate projects are overvalued, and investments may be made 
to negative net present value projects (Heaton, 2002)  
From value perspective, hubris hypothesis suggests that if bid price is under true company 
value, the bid is always rejected. In the cases that the bid price exceeds company value, 
target decision makers will accept the bid and transaction will be executed. As a result, 
bidder will always pay too much for the target, and targets are paid extra compared to the 
true company value. (Roll, 1986) Hubris hypothesis is aligned with semi-strong market 
efficiency that will be presented in section 2.9. As a result of hubris hypothesis, the price 
of target company should rise, and the price of bidder company should fall. Roll (1986) 
reports that values of targets and bidders have decreased and increased in different em-
pirical studies. Several issues on examining effects of the hubris hypothesis are presented. 
First, announcing the bid may contain information that is not related to transaction itself 
but can affect stock prices – for example information of financial performance of the 
bidding company. Secondly, as bidders are usually much larger than targets, capturing 
the effect of the bid is challenging, as overall performance of the bidder company has 
much more weight on bidder company’s price formation. Finally, the hubris hypothesis 
is against the assumption that company management always aim to maximize long term 
value of the company. (Roll, 1986) When comparing the hubris hypothesis to assumptions 
Grossman & Hart, frame-works are aligned if the bidder company’s management aims to 
Theory Description Effect on value 
Hubris Managers of the bidding company are 
overconfident
Negative
Empire 
building
Managers aim to maximize their own benefits by 
acquisitions 
Negative
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do their best to maximize shareholder value, but management is inefficient in their eval-
uation of target company’s true value, and they are willing to pay extra.   
Empire building theory 
Empire building theory as a merger motive is broadly researched area compared to other 
motives. The theory compares several phenomena and is it sometimes used as a umbrella 
term for several agency problem -related theories. Empire building theory is based on the 
claim that company management maximizes own benefits, rather than maximizing equity 
value for shareholders. (Trautwein, 1990) 
Managers try to maximize their own benefits with constraints set by capital markets and 
shareholders. Baumol (1959) suggested that managers maximize revenue rather with min-
imum profit constraint. Marris (1964) argues that managers aim to generate financially 
sustainable growth rate of assets. Variables such as company cars and over-staffing have 
been used to study empire building. Rhoades (1983) analyzed 1960s merger waves con-
glomerate mergers from the point of growth maximization. Finding was that growth max-
imization and power found as a merger motives, but profits also had also essential role. 
In the beginning of 1960s merger wave the profit was present first, but a shift to power 
motive was observed.    
One approach to empire building theory is to examine CEO compensation in relation to 
mergers. In can be argued, that if CEO owns 1% of company shares, he will lose 1% of 
equity value if nonprofitable is made, but will receive 100% of increased compensation 
(Berk and DeMarzo Peter, 2011) CEO compensation has taken a shift from stocks options 
to large cash compensations. This has resulted in a situation where CEO and stockholder 
interests are not as aligned as they are used to be. It is found that cash compensation gives 
CEOs an incentive to execute transactions in order to reach their maximal wealth. Typi-
cally, CEO salary is renegotiated if a merger occurs, and compensation is often tied with 
revenue and profit growth, not to actual performance of the merger. Thus, CEO will im-
prove the compensation even if a bad transaction is made, and situation is opposite for 
stockholder. (Harford and Li, 2005) 
When company is looking for growth, typical decision-making situation is between inter-
nal investment and merger. Therefore, relevant point of view to is to compare internal 
investments to mergers. It is found that typically internal investment does not lead to 
higher compensation for CEO. As mentioned, a merger is a catalyst to renegotiate CEO 
compensation. Overall, it is argued that cash-based compensation for CEO does not align 
incentives for management and owners, and leads to value-destroying mergers from 
shareholders’ point of view. (Harford and Li, 2005)    
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2.8 Signaling effect  
Grossman and Hart (1981) divided bids to two categories. On one hand, company has 
several small shareholders with limited resources to monitor market conditions and com-
pany’s performance and announcements. On the other hand, there are some large share-
holders, who in opposite to small owners have enough resources for monitoring the com-
pany. As a result, company performance monitoring is left for large owners. Another as-
sumption in Grossman’s and Hart’s framework is that company management will do their 
best to maximize shareholder value in long term, but there may be some inefficiencies.  
Large shareholder with monitoring responsibilities may acquire a company based on dis-
covery that current management is inefficient. This kind of bid is called allocational bid. 
Another type of bid is called acquisitional bid. In acquisitional bid company is took over 
by large market player based on information about target company’s performance. 
(Grossman and Hart, 1981) In case of allocational and acquisitional bids signaling effect 
is demonstrated. Small stockholders, which can be seen as markets in this case, get in-
formed about inefficient management or target company’s better than assumed perfor-
mance, when information about the bid is published. If there were not inefficiencies in 
management or performance was not better than markets assumed, no such a bid would 
have been occurred.  
In addition of signaling effect on the target and the bidding company’s value, there are 
also theories about signaling effect on other industry players. On one hand, positive sig-
naling effect could occur because other players in the industry would more likely to be-
come targets in future. On the other hand, the new larger entity resulting from transaction 
would have competitive advantage on the market based on its’ size, which is seen as a 
negative signal. (Funke, 2008)  
2.9 Market efficiency  
Eugene Fama published his first paper about research of market efficiency in 1970. Cap-
ital market can be seen primarily as a tool for capital and resource allocation for investors 
and companies. In theory, prices of securities reflect all information that is known about 
companies at the time, and investor can choose to which securities one wants to invest. 
Empirical research relating market efficiency have assumed market equilibrium, so that 
expected market return does not vary between market players. (Fama, 1970) Market equi-
librium can be defined as a state where marginal benefits of trading do not exceed mar-
ginal costs (Fama, 1991). As a result of Fama’s research, forms of market efficiency were 
divided to three categories (Fama, 1970): 
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Table 11. Three forms of market efficiency (Fama, 1970). 
 
Weak form of market efficiency means that historical information is reflected in stock 
prices. Empirical tests strongly support a claim that capital markets are efficient as stated 
in weak form of market efficiency. In model where time period is a day or longer, stock 
prices seems to act as a random walk. Empirical evidence shows that there is dependency 
between price changes and stock returns in a way that it could be used as a slightly prof-
itable trading rule. (Fama, 1970) These results suggest that weak form of market effi-
ciency clearly exists in capital markets, and there is some evidence that semi-strong form 
does not exists. Strong form cannot exist without semi-strong form holding. Additionally, 
one can observe that insider information exists, for example, management of public com-
panies have much more price-reflecting information compared to other investors (Jaffe, 
1974).    
Market efficiency is essential theoretical framework for this thesis, because event study 
method relies on the assumption that efficient market hypothesis holds. Especially, when 
short time period for abnormal return estimation is used, the more depended the research 
is on the assumption that new information will be immediately reflected on securities 
prices. Fama (1991) points out that there are large amounts of literature on event studies, 
were for example investment choices, dividend announcements and changes in capital 
structure and mergers and acquisition news are quickly reflected to stock prices. In that 
light the assumption of efficient markets seems to be realistic. Additionally, event study 
allows one to examine securities prices reactions in time, as event time is exactly known.  
Efficient market hypothesis has faced some critics. If market were fully efficient, there 
were not any incentive for finance and other professionals to gather and investigate infor-
mation, because securities would have right prices all the time (Grossmann and Stiglitz, 
1980). Another key point for critics is that some market participants are not rational as 
efficient market hypothesis assumes, and as investors tend to act as a group, this could 
lead to inefficiencies in asset prices for some periods of time (Malkiel, 2003) 
Stage of market efficiency Description
Weak form Historical information is fully reflected in 
securities prices
Semi-strong form Publicly available information is immediately 
reflected in securities prices
Strong form Insider information does not exist: all information 
is available for all market players and fully 
reflected in securieties prices
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3. M&A MARKET ENVIRONMENT  
The sample period from 2006 to 2009 included financial crisis. For that reason, it is es-
sential to be familiar with the M&A market environment during the sample period. This 
chapter describes the M&A market with its characteristics, and illustrates key drivers ef-
fecting the M&A activity, such as stock market conditions and other macro economical 
drivers.  
3.1 M&A activity in Finland 
In late-2007 dealmakers began to doubt state of credit market and economic environment. 
When crisis started, financing for M&A deals tightened and effected significantly activ-
ity. M&A deal value peaked to more than $1 trillion in 2006 in the US (Alexandridis et 
al., 2012), which can be seen as a proxy for global M&A development. Figure 4 illustrates 
deal activity by deal count and total value of the deals from 2003 to 2013. Figures in this 
chapter are based on deals where ownership of the acquirer exceeds 50% of target’s 
shares, canceled deals and IPOs are left out from the statistics.  
 
Figure 4. Total deal count and value in Finland from 2003 to 2013 (Jalonen and 
Suomalainen, 2014). 
Market peak before financial crisis was in 2006 with 698 deals totaling EUR 11.3B. Year 
2009 was the market bottom with 448 deals totaling EUR 1.3B. Market turmoil effected 
Finnish market with a lag. These figures are in line with M&A deals executed by public 
companies. The sample deals are described in “Data”-chapter. In took 4 years from 2009 
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to 2013 to reach pre-crisis levels in deal count and values. Figure 5 describes deal count 
and value in Finnish deals, where target is international, and acquirer is Finnish.      
 
Figure 5. Deal count and value, international target and domestic acquirer, in Finland 
from 2003 to 2013 (Jalonen and Suomalainen, 2014). 
Number of deals with international target and Finnish acquirer peaks in 2008 with 128. 
Cross-border deals may be process-wise more time consuming, resulting financial crisis 
effect to kick in later. Figure 6 describes deal count and value in Finnish domestic deals. 
 
Figure 6. Deal count and value, domestic target and international acquirer, in Finland 
from 2003 to 2013 (Jalonen and Suomalainen, 2014). 
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Domestic deal activity is much less volatile when compared to total cross-border activity 
by number of deals or by deal value. International activity is a better proxy for sample 
used in this thesis, because public companies are much more often involved in cross-
border deals compared to small companies. Figure 7 describes deal count and value in 
Finnish deals, where target is Finnish, and acquirer is international.      
 
 
Figure 7. Deal count and value, domestic target and international acquirer, in Finland 
from 2003 to 2013 (Jalonen and Suomalainen, 2014). 
Value of deals executed by international buyers in Finland crashed to EUR 256m in 2009 
and reached level of EUR 8.6B in 2013, describing great volatility in international deals. 
To conclude the M&A activity from 2006 to 2009, deal flows were effected significantly 
by financial crisis. The last year of the sample period, 2009, was the low point for M&A 
market in Finland. 
3.2 Macroeconomic drivers 
Section 3.1 described the M&A activity in Finland. This section provides a brief to mac-
roeconomic drivers which effect M&A activity. Selected drivers are valuation levels, 
stock market performance and volatility, GDB development and interest rate levels. Fig-
ure 8 illustrates valuation levels measured by P/E and EV/EBITDA multiples in Helsinki 
Stock Exchange.  
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Figure 8. P/E (bar) and EV/EBITDA (line) multiples for Helsinki Stock Exchange from 
2002 to 2016 (Kinnunen, 2017). 
Valuation multiples stayed more stable during financial crisis compared to M&A activity. 
Multiples reached the low point already in 2008 with P/E of approximately 10 and 
EV/EBITDA of approximately 7. Statistics are in line with the idea that low valuation 
levels are slowing down deal activity, as possible stagnated deal negotiations yield to low 
point of executed deals in 2009. As discussed in Literature review and theorical back-
ground -chapter, low valuation multiples would result to decline in activity, and favor use 
of cash a payment method by public acquirers. Figure 9 illustrates development of 
OMXPI index from 1999 to 2018.  
 
 
Figure 9. OMXHPI index from 1999 to 2018 (Nasdaq, 2018). 
Market decline in 2007, 2008 and 2009 supports the development in P/E and EV/EBITDA 
multiples during the financial crisis. Figure 10 illustrates VIX volatility index develop-
ment from 2004 to 2018.  
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Figure 10. VIX volatility index from 2004 to 2018 (Chicago Board Options Exchange, 
2018). 
High volatility decreases M&A activity, as buyers and sellers tend to have different views 
about fair valuation levels. Financial crisis was a period of high volatility, VIX index 
peaking to 80 points in 2009. Figure 11 illustrates GDB volume growth in Finland from 
1995 to 2014.  
 
Figure 11. GDP volume growth-% in Finland from 1995 to 2014 (Tilastokeskus, 2018). 
During the sample period, GDP volume growth in 2006 and 2007 is close to long term 
average, growth in 2008 is close to zero. Impact of financial crisis is most influential in 
2009, when GDP volume decreased by -8.3% from previous year. GDP growth-% is in 
line with the deal activity during the sample period. Figure 12 illustrates 12 months Euri-
bor rate from 1999 to 2017. 
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Figure 12. 12 months Euribor rate from 2004 to 2017 (Suomen Pankki, 2018). 
12 months Euribor rate is used as a proxy of overall interest rate level in Finland. Major 
decline in interest rate level occurred in 2008. Low interest rate level could accelerate 
M&A activity, as bank debt is used as one component to fund transactions.  
To conclude, valuations, stock market performance, stock market volatility, GDP volume 
growth and interest rate levels were in line with the M&A activity during the sample 
period.   
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4. DATA 
Fourth chapter provides description of data sample that is used in this study. Data set can 
be divided to two categories: M&A announcement data and stock price data.      
4.1 M&A announcements 
M&A announcement data consists of 77 stock announcements from beginning of 2006 to 
end of 2009 for companies listed in Helsinki Stock Exchange. Only transactions pub-
lished by stock releases are included in the sample. Press releases typically contain infor-
mation that is already known by the market, and thus is reflected in the stock price 
(Velassquez et al., 2016). Therefore, as aim is to capture abnormal return of new infor-
mation immediately after it is published, press releases are removed from the sample. 
Number of removed press releases was 82. Announcement database of Tampere Univer-
sity of Technology collected from Nasdaq was applied. Announcements in the database 
were categorized to 6 classes: 
• Acquisitions and tender offers 
• Company announcements 
• Decisions of annual general meetings 
• Investor news 
• Quarterly reports 
All announcements in first two categories were manually gone through to detect all true 
M&A announcements in the time period, as some of the M&A announcements were clas-
sified to be company announcements in the original data set.  
4.1.1 Companies and industries in the sample 
Total number count of companies in the sample is 49. List of sample companies:    
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Table 12. List of sample companies. 
 
On average, there were 1.6 M&A announcements per company in the sample. Five com-
panies with largest weight on the sample had 25 announcements in total, representing 
32% of the total sample. 36 companies had 1 announcement in the sample. Distribution 
of sample announcements by company: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Afarak Group Ixonos Technopolis
Affecto Keskisuomalainen Tecnotree 
Aspo Metso Teleste
Atria Nokia TeliaSonera 
BasWare Nurminen Logistics Terveystalo Healthcare 
Biotie Therapies Oral Hammaslääkärit Tulikivi 
CapMan Oriola-KD Turvatiimi
Cencorp Outokumpu Vacon
Componenta Outotec Wärtsilä
Comptel Panostaja Wulff-Yhtiöt 
Digia QPR Software YIT
Elisa Rautaruukki Aldata Solution 
Endero Revenio Group Dovre Group 
Etteplan Rocla Elcoteq
Exel Composites Stockmann  Glaston  
Fortum Takoma Tiimari  
HKScan 
List of sample companies
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Table 13. Distribution of sample announcements by company.   
 
Oral Hammaslääkärit is a dental and health company. Panostaja is an investment com-
pany that owns and develops small and mid-size Finnish companies. Basware is a soft-
ware company, delivering financial supply chain solutions. Revenio is a health company 
and TeliaSonera operates in telecommunications. Outcome is, that top 5 companies meas-
ured by number of announcements in the sample are operating mainly in different indus-
tries, so sample is quite diversified from this point of view. However, there is no evidence 
that shareholder value differs between industries.  
Sample companies are categorized to ten different industries. Classification used by 
Kauppalehti (Kauppalehti, 2018) is applied in this thesis. Distribution of sample compa-
nies and announcements by industry are presented in the next following two tables: 
 
 
 
Company Announcements Company Announcements
Oral Hammaslääkärit 9 Keskisuomalainen 1
Panostaja 6 Metso 1
BasWare 4 Nokia 1
Revenio Group 3 Nurminen Logistics 1
TeliaSonera 3 Oriola-KD 1
Afarak Group 2 Outokumpu 1
Aspo 2 QPR Software 1
CapMan 2 Rautaruukki 1
Etteplan 2 Rocla 1
Ixonos 2 Stockmann  1
Outotec 2 Tecnotree 1
Takoma 2 Teleste 1
Technopolis 2 Terveystalo Healthcare 1
Affecto 1 Tulikivi 1
Atria 1 Turvatiimi 1
Biotie Therapies 1 Vacon 1
Cencorp 1 Wärtsilä 1
Componenta 1 Wulff-Yhtiöt 1
Comptel 1 YIT 1
Digia 1 Aldata Solution 1
Elisa 1 Dovre Group 1
Endero 1 Elcoteq 1
Exel Composites 1 Glaston  1
Fortum 1 Tiimari  1
HKScan 1
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Table 14. Distribution of sample companies by industry. 
 
Table 15. Distribution of sample observations by industry. 
 
 
Industrial Goods and Services accounts for 33.7% and Technology for 24.5% of sample 
companies. Helsinki Stock Exchange is overweighed with machinery and technology 
companies. Thus, industry distribution in the sample is aligned with general characteris-
tics in the market. Weight of Oil & Gas companies in 0% in this sample. Nokia is repre-
sented in the sample by one announcement: Nokia announced to acquire NAVTEQ, a 
leading provider of digital map information systems, mobile navigation devices and In-
ternet-based mapping tools on 1st of October 2007 (Nokia, 2007) 
4.1.2 Time distribution of sample announcements 
The research period from 2006 to 2009 is characterized by financial crisis, as discussed 
in the second chapter. Number of announcements per year is presented in the next figure: 
Industry Companies Percentage
Industrial Goods and Services 17 34.7%
Technology 12 24.5%
Health Care 5 10.2%
Consumer Goods 5 10.2%
Finance 3 6.1%
Industrials 3 6.1%
Telecommunication 2 4.1%
Consurmer Services 1 2.0%
Utility services 1 2.0%
Oil & Gas 0 0.0%
Total 49 100.0%
Industry Observations Percentage
Industrial Goods and Services 21 27.3%
Technology 16 20.8%
Health Care 15 19.5%
Finance 10 13.0%
Consumer Goods 5 6.5%
Industrials 4 5.2%
Telecommunication 4 5.2%
Consurmer Services 1 1.3%
Utility services 1 1.3%
Oil & Gas 0 0.0%
Total 77 100.0%
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Figure 13. Number of announcements per year in the sample. 
Announcements per year remains quite stable during the sample period 2006 to 2008. 
Market peaks in 2007 with 25 announcements, after which starts a moderate decline. To-
tal deal count peaked in 2006 in Finland (see chapter 3), so there is a slight difference 
between the transaction count of total market and a subset of deals executed by public 
companies. Credit crisis hit in 2007, and these figures are in line that information, keeping 
in mind that the US M&A activity peaked already in 2006. One could say that there is a 
slight lag between effects of financial crisis between the US and Finland. Next figure 
presents cumulative count of sample announcements:  
 
Figure 14. Cumulative count of announcements in the sample. 
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It can be seen, that announcements are cumulated with a constant pace from 2006 to 2008. 
Following table shows that how observations are placed in relation to the start of financial 
crisis. One definition for  the start of financial crisis is June 2007 (Erkens et al. (2012)) 
and this definition is applied in this study.  
 
 
Figure 15. Number of announcements after and before of the start of financial crisis in 
June 2007. 
36% of the announcements occur before start of the financial crisis, and 64% of the an-
nouncements occur after start of the financial crisis. This classification illustrates the ar-
gument that the sample period is characterized by financial crisis. 
4.1.3 Deal-specific characteristics 
M&A announcements in the sample are segmented by geography, legal form of target, 
target’s positioning in value chain and by payment method. The following 4 tables illus-
trates sample distribution to these categories. 
Table 16. Distribution of sample observations by geography.  
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Domestic 11 16 4 7 38
Cross-border 7 9 14 9 39
Total 18 25 18 16 77
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Table 17. Distribution of sample observations by legal form of target. 
 
Table 18. Distribution of sample observations by target’s positioning in value chain. 
 
Table 19. Distribution of sample observations by payment method. 
 
49% of the deals are domestic transactions, and in 51% cases the target is headquartered 
outside Finland. Only 22% of targets are public companies, a purchase of small private 
companies is usually much more common. Majority, 77% of deals are horizontal, vertical 
deals accounts for 9% and conglomerate deals for 14% of observations deals. Cash is 
most common type payment type with 53% share, only stocks is used in 12% and com-
bination of stocks and cash in 35% of transactions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Private 15 20 14 11 60
Public 3 5 4 5 17
Total 18 25 18 16 77
2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Horizontal 14 20 12 13 59
Vertical 1 1 3 2 7
Conglomerate 3 4 3 1 11
Total 18 25 18 16 77
2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Cash 9 12 13 7 41
Stocks 2 3 1 3 9
Mixed 7 10 4 6 27
Total 18 25 18 16 77
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4.2 Stock price data 
Stock price data of individual companies from 01.01.2006 to 31.12.2009 provided by 
Tampere University of Technology is used in this thesis. The sample consists of compa-
nies listed in Helsinki Stock Exchange. 5 minutes timestep is applied in the study. Refer-
ence index used as a market return is OMX Helsinki Price Index (=OMXHPI), which is 
a market-weighted index of all Helsinki Stock Exchange companies. Starting point for 
the index was 1,000 points in 28.12.1990. Following Figure presents OMXHPI develop-
ment from 01.01.2006-31.12.2009, which is also the sample period used in this study. 
 
Figure 16. OMXHPI index from 2006 to 2009 (Nasdaq, 2018). 
Index values are calculated as an average of lowest and highest value for a trading day. 
Next table presents OMXHPI development from 01.01.1999 to 03.04.2018.     
 
Figure 17. OMXHPI index from 1999 to 2018 (Nasdaq, 2018). 
In figure 17 close-prices for trading days are used, because high and low values are not 
available for the period. It can be seen from figures 17 and 18 that a stock market crash 
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occurs during the sample period. From this perspective one could argue, that sample is 
biased – shareholder earnings may be higher or lower during a stock crash period com-
pared to average performance.  
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5. HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
Fifth chapter describes the study hypotheses and used research methodology. First, hy-
pothesis regarding to acquirer’s shareholder returns and deal characteristics are defined. 
Secondly, event study methodology is walked through by presenting constant mean 
model and market model, defining estimation and event window, and finally presenting 
market model methodology in vector form.  
5.1 Research hypotheses 
As discussed in the literature review, there are inconsistent results about M&A value cre-
ation. Secondly, some theories suggest positive and some negative effect of M&A on 
shareholder value. General M&A studies have tried to explain the impact of announce-
ment effect on acquirer’s or target’s shareholders returns, or combined returns. For ex-
ample, Alexandridis et al. (2012) researched domestic deals in US markets from 2003 to 
late-2007 and reported negative returns for acquirer’s shareholders. Ma et al. (2009) ex-
amined returns in Asia and found positive returns. Moreover, M&A returns are reported 
in several studies where focus has been to explain how different factors effect on return. 
Again, with inconsistent results. Thus, there is no reason to expect positive or negative 
returns for acquirer. From these perspectives, main hypothesis for this event study is de-
fined as follows: 
H1: M&A announcements do not lead to abnormal returns for acquirer’s sharehold-
ers on an aggregate level  
Deal-specific characteristics  
This study tries to explain also explain variation of the returns by deal-specific character-
istics. Hypotheses H2-H5 examine geographical location of acquirer and target, legal form 
of target, deal structure and payment method. These study questions are typical in M&A 
event studies, as discussed in the second chapter. Hypotheses are formed in a way that 
they represent the most probable result based on earlier studies.  
One angle is to research cross-border transactions. On one hand, there are some difficul-
ties in cross-border transactions, such as cultural integration, which may affect the returns. 
On the other hand, another common idea state that higher level of corporate governance 
leads to higher returns, and thus M&A returns effected by proportional level of a corpo-
rate governance in acquirer’s and target’s home country (Martynova and Renneboog, 
2008). As this study focuses on Finnish markets alone, cultural characteristics or level 
over corporate governance may differentiate the returns. Results of cross-border studies 
are inconsistent, for example, Martynova & Renneboog (2008) reported higher returns 
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for domestic deals and Bris & Capolis (2004) reported lower returns for domestic trans-
actions. However, greater share of studies has presented higher returns for domestic deals.  
H2: Domestic transactions yield to higher returns compared to cross-border trans-
actions 
Legal form of a target is a commonly researched factor of M&A performance and theories 
on the impact on returns are related to valuation and asymmetric information-based 
frameworks. Illiquidity discount suggests that acquirer has to pay higher price for public 
targets, and thus it is more beneficial to acquire private targets. (Fuller et al., 2002) Capron 
and Shen (2005) reported positive returns for acquirer when target was a private company 
and negative return when target was a public company. Fuller et al. (2002) shown similar 
results.  
H3: Public target company yields to lower returns compared to private targets  
Positioning in the value chain is interesting question. It examines impacts of different 
strategic choices, and is discussed in section 2.6, different merger waves were character-
ized by different transaction types. In horizontal mergers two companies are competitors 
and synergies are achieved. (Wübben, 2007) From this perspective it could be argued that 
horizontal transactions yield to higher returns compared to two other type of transactions. 
Bris and Cabolis (2004) reported negative returns for non-horizontal mergers, and Fan & 
Goyal (2006) found positive returns for horizontal and vertical transactions compared to 
total sample. Thus, there are slight variations in earlier studies. Theoretical background 
favors horizontal mergers, thus hypothesis H4 is defined as follows: 
H4: Vertical and conglomerate deals yield to lower returns compared to horizontal 
transactions 
Payment method is one of the most researched areas of M&A transactions. Payment 
method has an impact on for example taxation and liquidity and more importantly, it has 
signaling effect. Stock is typically used as a payment method if it is overvalued (Jensen, 
2004). Thus, use of stocks signals overvaluation of acquirer, and cash signals undervalu-
ation. Typical studies compare impact of use of cash, use of stocks or a combination of 
stocks and cash as a payment method. For example, Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) reported 
that transactions paid with stocks performed worst, and Loughran & Anand (1997) 
showed similar results. There are consistent results on cash versus stock studies, but role 
of hybrid payment is not as clear. Finally, hypothesis H5 is set as follows:    
H5: Use of stocks or a combination of stocks and cash as a payment method yields to 
lower returns compared to use of cash as a payment method 
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5.2 Constant-mean model and market model 
To capture an impact of an event, one must first determine abnormal return. The abnormal 
return is defined as the actual return of the security minus normal return of the security in 
the event window. (Pagan, 1996) The normal return is the expected return when no event 
takes place. For firm i and date T expected return is defined as 
𝜀𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡),         (1) 
where 𝜀𝑖𝑡
∗  is abnormal return, Rit is actual return and 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡) is normal return for time 
period t. Xt is conditioning information for the normal return model. (Pagan, 1996)  
Event study methodology is presented in vector-form according to Pagan 1996. Both con-
stant mean model and market model are shown. Only market model is used in this thesis. 
Rt is a (N x 1) vector of asset returns for time period t. Assumptions are that Rt is inde-
pendently multivariate normally distributed with mean µ and covariance matrix Ω for all 
t. 
Constant-mean model  
For constant mean model we have 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = µ𝑖 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡,          (2) 
𝐸[𝜉𝑖𝑡] = 0,           (3) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝜉𝑖𝑡] =  𝜎𝜉𝑖
2 ,          (4) 
where Rit is ith element of Rt is period-t return for security i, 𝜉𝑖𝑡 is disturbance term and  
𝜎𝜉𝑖
2   is the (i, i) element of covariance matrix Ω. Constant-mean model assumes that the 
mean of a stock is constant trough time. Constant mean model might be the simplest 
model for modeling normal performance for stocks. (Pagan, 1996) Brown and Warner 
(1980) results show that the simplest method, constant mean model, has nearly same ex-
planatory power compared to more sophisticated models, market model and risk adjusted 
returns model. However, explanatory power decreases more with constant mean model, 
compared for example to market model, if clustering, simultaneous impact of event on 
several securities, occurs. Clustering increases variance of the residuals because they are 
positively correlated across multiple securities. (Brown and Warner, 1980)  
Market model 
Even though constant mean model gives similar results compared to more advanced mod-
els, one major disadvantage of constant mean model is high variance. Common approach 
is to reduce variance by using market model (MacKinlay, 1997). In market model return 
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of a stock i is measured by relation to return of market return. Advantage of market model 
is to capture part of the variance of a stock i which is result of a variance of market port-
folio. (Pagan, 1996) In market model, for security i 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,         (5) 
𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑡] = 0,           (6) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝜀𝑖𝑡] = 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2 ,          (7) 
where Rit is the return of security i for time period t and Rmt is market return for time 
period i. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the zero-mean disturbance term, and 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖 and 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  are market model pa-
rameters. For market return, broad stock indexes, such as S&P500 are used. Also value-
weighted and equal-weighted indexes, such as CRSP value-weighted and CRSP equal-
weighted indexes are common choices. (Pagan, 1996) In this study, market return is esti-
mated by OMXHPI as discussed in Data-chapter.  
5.3 Data frequency, estimation window and event window 
Let Ṯ = 0 be the event date, Ṯ = T1+1 to be start of event window and Ṯ = T2 end of event 
window. Estimation window is presented by Ṯ = T0 as a starting point and Ṯ = T1 as an 
end. Note, that with this definition there is no overlap between estimation and event win-
dow. Post-event window starts from Ṯ = T2+1 and ends to Ṯ = T3. Timeline for the event 
study is presented in figure 18.  
 
Figure 18 Illustration of event study time line (Pagan, 1996) 
Length of the estimation window, event window and post-event window are L1 = T1- T0, 
L2 = T2- T1, and L2 = T3- T2. 
Data frequency 
As discussed in literature review, most of the studies use daily data, usually close-prices, 
to estimate performance. One disadvantage of daily data is, that announcement effect may 
occur after minutes of the publication, and it will not be captured by using daily data. Use 
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of intraday data allows the study to examine how investors process the new information 
(Velassquez et al., 2016) Secondly, information is lost the coarseness of daily data. (Lee, 
Mucklow and Ready, 1993) Thirdly, use of more frequent interval increases the explan-
atory power (MacKinlay, 1997) Implication of these arguments is that use of intraday 
data is preferable. However, use of as frequent as possible data points is not optimal, 
unless correction term for microstructure noise is used (Aït-Sahalia, Mykland and Zhang, 
2005). In this thesis 5 minutes timestep is used, on one hand to capture short term reac-
tions, and on the other hand to prevent effects of market microstructure noise.   
Estimation window 
Selecting an estimation window length, trade-off is made between long estimation win-
dow and short estimation window. Long estimation window is in favor for larger data 
sample size. However, market characteristics may have more likely changed during the 
estimation period if estimation window is long. Additionally, estimation window may be 
more likely disturbed by non-related events effecting on stock performance. (Krivin et 
al., 2003) 
Estimation window of 950 steps, which converts to about 10 trading days, is used in this 
study. With use of daily close-prices for stocks, 950 steps would convert to estimation 
window length of 4 years. As discussed, shorter estimation window decreases the likeli-
hood of confounding events and changes in market characteristics. Additionally, short 
estimation window decreases heteroscedasticity (Velassquez et al., 2016).  
Event window 
One difficulty is event study setup is to prevent confounding events in an event window. 
If the are other major financially effecting events in the event window, capturing of the 
impact of the one particular event is distracted. (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997) Similar 
trade-off between advantages of sample size and disadvantages of window length is to be 
consider with event window length as was with estimation window length. 
One issue to be treated is uncertainty of the event date. Even though announcements in 
the data sample contain exact time-stamp, part of the announcements may be published 
after the stock markets are closed. In this case the impact is of the event will occur in day 
1 and will not be captured with event window of one day. To prevent the risk of missing 
an event, event window can be expanded from one day to two or three days. (MacKinlay, 
1997) Alternative approach would be to use one day event window and to examine 
whether announcements are published before or after the stock market closing, and ad-
justing event day one day forward in the case of publication after the markets are closed.      
Event window of 3 days is used in this study. On one hand, event window is kept as short 
as possible to decrease probability of confounding events. On the other hand, use of three 
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days window prevents the missing of an event. With timestep of 5 minutes, there are 285 
observations in the event window.  
5.4 Market model in vector form 
Let Ri = [Ri To+1  …  Ri T1]’ be an (L1 x 1) vector of estimation window returns, Xi = [ԍRm] 
an (L1 x 2) vector with a vector of ones in first column and market returns Rm = [Rm To+1  
…  Rm T1]’ in the second column, and Ɵi = [αi βi]’ a (2x1) parameter vector. Derived from 
equation (5), estimation window returns R for stock i are expressed as a regression model: 
𝑅𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖Ɵi + 𝜀𝑖 .            (8) 
Assuming that general conditions of OLS hold, market model parameters for estimation 
window are as follows: 
 Ɵ?̂? = (𝑋𝑖
′𝑋𝑖 )
−1𝑋𝑖
′𝑅𝑖,         (9)  
?̂?𝜀𝑖
2 =
1
𝐿1− 2
𝜀?̂?
′𝜀?̂?,          (10) 
 ?̂?𝑖 = 𝑅𝑖  −  𝑋𝑖Ɵî,           (11) 
𝑉𝐴𝑅[Θ?̂?] = (𝑋𝑖
′𝑋𝑖 )
−1𝜎𝜀𝑖
2 .         (12) 
Using equation (11) for event window returns, we have 
 𝜀?̂?
∗ =  𝑅𝑖
∗  −  ?̂?𝑖ԍ - ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚
∗  =  𝑅𝑖
∗  −  𝑋𝑖
∗Ɵî,       
 (13) 
where R = [Ri T1+1  … Ri T2]’ is (L2 x 1) vector of event returns, [ԍ𝑋𝑖
∗] is (L2 x 2) matrix of 
ones in first column and market returns Rm = [Rm T1+1  …  Rm T2]’ in second column, and 
Ɵî is parameter vector [?̂?𝑖 ?̂?𝑖]′.  For abnormal returns zero mean of error terms can be 
shown:  
𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑖
∗] = 𝐸[𝑅𝑖
∗  −  𝑋𝑖
∗Ɵ̂i|𝑋𝑖
∗]  =   . . .   =  0.      (14) 
And for abnormal returns covariance matrix: 
𝑉𝑖 = 𝐸[𝜀?̂?
∗𝜀?̂?
∗|𝑋𝑖
∗] = . . . =  𝐼𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  + 𝑋𝑖
∗(𝑋𝑖
′𝑋𝑖)
−1𝑋𝑖
∗′𝜎𝜀𝑖
2   ,     (15) 
where I is (L2 x L2) identity matrix. For cumulative abnormal returns we have  
𝐶𝐴?̂?𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2)  =  𝛾
′𝜀?̂?
∗ ,         (16) 
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where T1 < 𝜏1 ≤ 𝜏2 ≤ T2,  𝛾 is (L2 x 1) vector with ones in positions from 𝜏1  −  T1  to 
𝜏2  −  T1, and 𝜀?̂?
∗ is abnormal returns for stock i. Variance of cumulative abnormal return 
is: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝐶𝐴?̂?𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2)]  = 𝜎?̂?(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =  𝛾
′𝑉𝜀?̂?
∗.      (17) 
Standardized cumulative abnormal return (SCAR) is defined as 
𝑆𝐶𝐴?̂?𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2)  =  
𝐶𝐴?̂?𝑖(𝜏1,𝜏2)
𝜎?̂?(𝜏1,𝜏2)
.        (18) 
Assuming general conditions of OLS to hold,  𝑆𝐶𝐴?̂?𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) distribution is Student t, 
with degrees of freedom L1 – 2. Given the equal weight for each stock, average SCAR 
for a sample of N securities is 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝑆𝐶𝐴?̂?𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2)
𝑁
𝑖=1 .        (19) 
For testing the null hypothesis, J1, where non-standardized returns are applied, or J2 with 
standardized returns, can be used. (Pagan, 1996) In this thesis, J2 is presented. J2 is de-
fined as 
𝐽2 = (
𝑁(𝐿1− 4)
𝐿1 − 2 
)
1
2
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝜏1, 𝜏2)~𝑁(0, 1),       (20) 
where N is number of securities, L1 length of estimation window, and 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is average of 
standardized cumulative abnormal returns. (Pagan, 1996) When using 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , more 
weight is given for stocks with lower variance, which is preferable choice when abnormal 
return is constant in sample. When abnormal returns is higher for stocks with larger var-
iance, better choice for testing null hypothesis would have been use of 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (Pagan, 1996) 
Patell (1976) applied standardization of price changes by estimates of stock’s estimate of 
price variability, finding statistically more stable results compared to un-standardized 
methodology. Standardization accounts for possible heteroskedasticity in sample and pos-
sibly increase power of the test (Brown and Warner, 1985) 
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6. RESULTS 
The results chapter reports the findings of this thesis. The study sample consisted of 77 
M&A announcement observations on time period from 2006 to 2009 and event study 
methodology was used to examine shareholder returns. Results are observed in relation 
to study hypothesis presented in the fifth chapter and they are compared to earlier results 
presented in literature review. Section 6.1 reports the shareholder returns for acquiring 
company and section 6.2 presents results of multivariate regression examining the impact 
of event specific characteristics. Section 6.3 summarizes results.       
6.1 Returns 
Shareholder returns of the acquiring company were studied by event study using event 
window of 3 days with 5 minutes timesteps. Figure 19 presents the SCAR for acquiring 
company.   
 
Figure 19. SCAR of acquiring company in 3 days event window with 5 minutes timesteps. 
It can be observed that SCAR fluctuates around 0.0% on negative and positive side from 
timestep -134 to timestep 0. At the event time T=0 SCAR rises immediately from 0.0% 
to 0.41% and reaches the maximum of 0.51% on timestep 8, 40 minutes after the an-
nouncement. After the maximum point there is a slight downward drift, and at the end of 
the event window SCAR is at 0.37%. This result shows that acquirer’s shareholders re-
ceive slightly positive returns from M&A activity. Before discussing this result further, it 
is essential to examine statistical power of the result. Statistical significance is studied by 
J2 test for SCAR. Next two charts present J2 test statistic from SCAR in 3 days event 
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window. Chart 20 shows J2 from beginning of event window to the last timestep just be-
fore the announcement. Second chart presents J2 from the first timestep just after the an-
nouncement to the end of event window. SCAR is reset in chart 21.  
 
Figure 20. J2 test statistic for SCAR before the announcement time T=0. Dashed line 
represents 95% confidence interval and solid line represents 99% confidence interval.  
  
Figure 21. J2 test statistic for SCAR after the announcement time T=0. Dashed line rep-
resents 95% confidence interval and solid line represents 99% confidence interval.   
Figure 20 shows that J2 fluctuates on both sides of zero before the announcement, approx-
imately between 1 and -1. Outcome confirms the result from SCAR figure that there are 
no abnormal returns before the announcement. In figure 21 J2 begins to rise just after the 
event and reaches the maximum value on timestep 7, 35 minutes after the announcement. 
After the peak J2 declines to close-to-zero level. J2 values immediately after the event are 
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statistically significant at 99% confidence level. These findings confirm that Hypothesis 
1 is rejected.  
J2 is sound test statistic to be used if observations are normally distributed. Figure 22 
illustrates distribution of SCARs in the sample. 
 
Figure 22. Distribution of SCARs in the sample (N=77). 
SCAR distribution resembles normal distribution, with slightly more weight on close-to-
zero positive values. Thus, J2 can be argued to be right test statistic. Moreover, the choice 
between J1 and J2 is significant, because variance of the returns is on similar levels across 
different securities. 
The result for SCAR is in line with earlier studies. For example, Ma et al. (2009), Georgen 
& Renneboog (2002), and Mulherin & Boone (2000) reported slightly positive returns 
from 0.7% to 1.7%, and there is not empirical evidence for high positive returns. On con-
trary, some studies, for example Alexandridis et al. (2012) and Martynova & Renneboog 
(2008b), reported slightly negative acquirer’s shareholder returns. It is to be noted that 
several studies indicating negative returns used a sample of U.S. companies, and several 
studies outside U.S. indicated positive returns.   
As the sample period from 2006 to 2009 is flavored with financial crisis, one question 
was to if financial crisis effects the returns. The sample was divided to two time periods: 
the first period ended to last day of June 2007 (period before start of financial crisis), the 
0
5
10
15
20
25
-6% -5% -4% -3% -2% -1% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6%
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
SCAR-%
Distribution of SCARs
53 
second period started on first day of July 2007 (period on and after financial crisis). Figure 
23 shows SCAR for the two time periods in 3-day event window.  
 
Figure 23. SCARs in 3 days event window with 5 minutes timesteps for time period before 
financial crisis (dashed line) and for time period during and after financial crisis (solid 
line).  
SCARs for the two time periods resemble the SCAR for total sample. There is a slight 
upward drift in the SCAR plot for before financial crisis for few timesteps before the 
announcements. However, this is only an illustration of information leakage before the 
official announcement. It can be argued that returns for acquirer shareholders remained 
the same before and after of the start of financial crisis. However, these results are not 
statistically meaningful, due to low number of observations in the sample. 
6.2 Regression analysis 
Multivariate regression is used to study impact of transaction-specific explanatory factors 
on acquirer’s shareholder return. Table 20 lists independent variables that are used in the 
multivariate regression. Dependent variable is 3-day SCAR.   
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Table 20. List of independent variables in the regression analysis.    
  
Aim is to study whether hypothesis presented in the fifth chapter hold true. Transaction 
year is added to the regression to find out if there are any changes in returns relative to 
time, keeping in mind that financial crisis started during the sample period. Next table 
presents the results of the multivariate regression analysis.   
Table 21. Regression output. Statistically significant result is marked with *.    
 
“Stock”-coefficient is negative. Thus, the regression analysis suggests that transactions 
that are announced to be paid by stock yield lower returns for acquirer’s shareholders 
compared to transactions paid by cash. P-value for “Stock” coefficient is 0.026, so the 
result is statistically significant. “Mixed”-coefficient is 0.000, suggesting that transactions 
paid by combination of stock and cash yield does not have any effect compared to trans-
actions paid by cash. P-value for “Mixed”-coefficient is 0.999, resulting that the finding 
Domestic Target is headquartered in Finland
Public Target is a public company
Vertical Target operates before or after acquirer in value chain
Conglomerate Target opeates in unrelated industry
Stock Payment type is stock
Mixed Payment type is combination of cash and stock
Year 2007 Announcement occurs in 2007
Year 2008 Announcement occurs in 2008
Year 2009 Announcement occurs in 2009
Independent variables used in the regression analysis
Note: "Horizontal", "Cash" and "Year 2006" are excluded from the 
regression, and they serve as a reference category for transaction type, 
payment type and year
R-squared 0.116
Observations 77
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept 0.772 0.461 1.676 0.098
Domestic 0.098 0.379 0.258 0.797
Public -0.218 0.420 -0.519 0.606
Vertical -0.873 0.599 -1.457 0.150
Conglomerate -0.161 0.494 -0.326 0.746
Stock -1.287 0.565 -2.278 0.026*
Mixed 0.000 0.372 0.001 0.999
Year 2007 -0.419 0.451 -0.930 0.356
Year 2008 -0.164 0.512 -0.321 0.749
Year 2009 0.107 0.512 0.209 0.835
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to be statistically non-meaningful. Hypothesis 5 holds partly, cash as a payment type 
yields to higher returns compared to stock payments. However, there is no evidence to 
support any difference between returns when cash or combination of cash and stock are 
used as a payment method. Earlier studies provide similar findings, Martynova & 
Renneboog (2009) and Eckbo & Thorburn reported worst returns for transactions paid by 
cash. Furthermore, this finding supports the valuation-based theories (for example Steiner 
(1976) and Jensen (1984)), suggesting that overvalued companies tend to use stock as a 
mean of payment, and thus giving a negative signal to the markets. 
“Vertical”-coefficient is negative, suggesting that vertical transactions yield lower returns 
compared to horizontal transactions. P-value of 0.15 does not fulfill the criteria for statis-
tical significance, but it is relatively close to a threshold to be meaningful. “Conglomer-
ate”-coefficient is also negative, but without statistical power. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is 
rejected. Literature provided inconsistent evidence regarding vertical, horizontal and con-
glomerate, so rejection of Hypothesis 4 is in line with earlier studies. For example, Eckbo 
(1983) reported horizontal mergers to be the most profitable, but Wübben’s (2007) study 
suggested conglomerate mergers to yield highest profits.  
Domestic transactions are suggested to yield higher returns for acquirer stockholders, as 
Hypothesis 2 states. The result is not statistically significant, but the positive sign of the 
coefficient is in line with earlier studies, such as Martynova and Renneboog (2008b), 
keeping in mind that studies regarding domestic and cross-border transactions provide 
inconsistent results. “Public target” had also negative sign as predicted, but result is not 
statistically significant, and Hypothesis 3 is rejected. P-values for “Domestic”, “Public”, 
and year coefficients are so high, that no statistically significant conclusions can be drawn 
from this study. 
Robustness check 
3-day event window was applied in this study, and the decision to choose a certain length 
for event window is exposed to subjective choice, even though event window length was 
chosen based on earlier studies. Regression analysis was conducted for the end of event 
window SCARs (12 hours). To check the robustness of regression results, regression anal-
ysis was conducted also for SCARs at 8 hours, 4 hours, 2 hours, 1 hours, 35 minutes and 
30 minutes after the announcement. 35 and 30 minutes were chosen, because peak of the 
return occurred 35 minutes after the announcement. The idea is to check signs of the 
coefficients and P-values with different specifications. Statistically significant results 
from the original regression model maintain same signs with different SCARs more 
likely, and coefficients with high P-value are more likely to change signs. Table 22 pre-
sents the signs of regression coefficients with different SCARs. 
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Table 22. Regression coefficients signs with different SCARs. Statistically significant re-
sult is marked with *.    
 
Table 22 shows that results are similar with 12 hours to 1-hour SCARs: the only statisti-
cally significant finding is that cash as a payment method yielded lower returns compared 
to transactions paid by stocks. “Stock”-coefficient maintained the minus sign with differ-
ent model specifications. P-value for “Stock”-coefficient remained approximately at the 
same level with the original 12 hours SCAR model (P=0.026) from tests with 12 hours to 
1-hour SCARs, and the results were not meaningful with 35 minutes and 30 minutes 
SCARs. “Vertical”-coefficient had the second lowest P-value (P=0.150), and signs of the 
coefficient remained consistent with different model specifications. Furthermore, “Pub-
lic”-coefficient kept the negative sign in the robustness check, P-value in original model 
was 0.606. However, “Vertical” and “Public” did not reach statistical power with any of 
the model specifications.   
“Domestic”, Conglomerate” and “Mixed” had changing signs with different model spec-
ifications. These coefficients did not have statistical significance in the original regression 
(12 hours). In addition, robustness check revealed that signs of coefficients were subject 
to model specification, and no conclusions of the signs can be made. P-values for the 
coefficients were high: for “Domestic” P = 0.797, for “Conglomerate P=0.746, and for 
“Mixed” P = 0.999), which is in line with the finding that signs changed with different 
models.  
6.3 Summary 
This study had five hypothesis, and main hypothesis had several sub-questions regarding 
abnormal returns. Study method to analyze Hypothesis H1 was to generate SCAR and J2 
plots based on the sample. Hypothesis H2-H5 were tested by conducting a multivariate 
regression to explain 3-day event window SCAR by deal-specific characteristics. Sum-
mary of results is presented in table 23.   
 
 
Coefficient 12 hours1) 8 hours 4 hours 2 hours 1 hour 35 mins 30 mins
Domestic + + - - - - -
Public - - - - - - -
Vertical - - - - - - -
Conglomerate - - + + - - -
Stock - * - * - * - * - * - -
Mixed + - - - + + -
1) Note: 12 hours after the announcement equals to original 3-days SCAR
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Table 23. Summary of results.    
 
 
Hypothesis H1 was rejected and part of H5 was proven to hold with statistically significant 
empirical evidence. In original regression, coefficients had expected signs for each of the 
variables regarding the study hypothesis H2-H5, except in the case of mixed payments 
(combination of stocks and cash) coefficient had value of 0.000, instead of minus-sign, 
which was expected. In addition, robustness check showed that regression coefficients of 
stock payments, vertical transactions and public targets remained same-signed with dif-
ferent model specifications, whereas coefficients regarding domestic deals, conglomerate 
deals and mixed payments were inconsistent as they had different signs.    
Hypotesis Description Result
H1
M&A announcements do not lead to 
abnormal returns for acquirer’s 
shareholders on an aggregate level.
M&A announcements lead to 0.37% SCAR for acquirer's 
shareholders in 3-day event window. Result is statistically 
significant at 99% confidence level.
H2
Domestic transactions yield to higher 
returns compared to cross-border 
transactions.
The study did not provide statistically meaningful results. 
Additionally, signs of the coefficients changed with different 
model specifications.
H3
Public target company yields to lower 
returns compared to private targets. 
The results imply that public targets yield to lower returns, but the 
result is not statictically significant. 
H4
Vertical and conglomerate deals yield to 
lower returns compared to horizontal 
transactions.
The study suggests that vertical transactions lead to lower retuns 
compared to horizontal transactions, result is close to being 
statitically meaningful. Statistically sound results regarding 
conglomerate transactions was not found, and  signs of the 
coefficients changed with different model specifications.
H5
Use of stocks or a combination of stocks 
and cash as a payment method yields to 
lower returns compared to use of cash as 
a payment method.
Use of stocks yields to lower returns, and the results is 
statistically significant at 95% confidence level. Statistically sound 
results regarding mixed payments was not found, and  signs of 
the coefficients changed with different model specifications.
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
This study focused examining effects of M&A announcements for acquirer’s sharehold-
ers. The data set included M&A announcements published as stock exchange releases 
with exact timestamps and stock price data with 5-minute time intervals from 2006 to 
2009 from companies listed in Helsinki Stock Exchange. This thesis focused on short-
term returns, and event study with 10-day estimation window and 3-day event window 
was conducted to observe intraday returns. Standardized cumulative abnormal returns 
(SCAR) was chosen as a metric for shareholder returns and statistical significance was 
examined by J2 test statistics. Additionally, effects of transaction-specific attributes on 
returns was researched by conducting a multivariate regression on 3-day SCAR. 
Effects of M&A announcements has been widely researched field in the past and great 
proportion of earlier studies has been also event studies. Earlier studies include topics 
such as return of acquirer’s shareholders in general, comparison of different markets, 
cross-border transactions, merger waves, comparison on effects of private and public tar-
gets, positioning of target in value chain relative to acquirer, and effects of payment meth-
ods. In addition to empirical studies are there several theoretical frameworks, such as 
agency theories and signaling effect. This thesis focuses on companies listed in Helsinki 
Stock Exchange. Majority of M&A studies are conducted in the US, and samples in Eu-
ropean studies include usually transactions from larger markets, such as Germany. There-
fore, this thesis contributes in relation to earlier research by focusing on a market that is 
not widely researched.  
Short term returns are searched in earlier studies, but most common approach is to use 
daily returns. Use of daily returns lack the opportunity to investigate intra-day returns, 
keeping in mind that stock markets react to new information in a matter of minutes or 
hours, and there might be some intra-day patterns. This study used 5-minute timesteps 
and thus shed light to intra-day returns, which has been rarely studied phenomena in 
M&A event study context. 
Most of the earlier studies use longer sample periods, such as 10 or 20 years. The sample 
used in this thesis was from beginning of 2006 to end of 2009 includes financial crisis 
that started in 2007. This opened an opportunity to investigate effects of financial crisis 
on the returns, which is rarely investigated angle in earlier studies.  
Main objective of the thesis was to study short term returns of M&A announcement for 
acquirer’s shareholders. Acquirer’s shareholder received positive SCAR of 0.37% in 3-
day event window, and the results was significant at 99% confidence level. This result is 
in line with earlier studies, however, negative SCARs have also been reported in previous 
literature. The market reaction after an announcement is immediate, and SCAR reaches 
59 
the maximum in 35 minutes after an announcement and after the maximum point there is 
a slight negative drift. This result could imply that first effect to the announcement is 
overreaction, and markets need time to analyze the information further. Effect of financial 
crisis on returns was also studied. Pre-crisis and post-crisis returns was shown to be sim-
ilar, however, without statistical significance. Even though financial crisis effected M&A 
activity and shock in stock markets decreased valuation levels, the effects of announce-
ments remained the same. 
 A multivariate regression on SCAR revealed that use of stocks as a payment method 
compared to cash yielded to lower returns. This result was statistically significant at 95% 
confidence level. Domestic transactions yielded higher returns compared to cross-border 
deals, target being a public company was a negative factor, vertical and conglomerate 
deals yielded to negative returns compared to horizontal transactions, and there was no 
difference between use of cash or a combination of stocks and cash as a payment method. 
These results were mainly expected based on earlier studies, but only the finding of cash 
versus stock payments was statistically meaningful. The outcome is typical for M&A 
event studies: there are inconsistent results about the returns itself and also about the deal-
specific explanatory factors on the returns. This leads often to situations were impacts of 
explanatory factors are not statistically significant. 
There are several limitations in this study. Firstly, the sample size is relatively low, and 
there may be inaccuracies in the original data. Secondly, there may be errors in processing 
the original data to purposes of this study. Thirdly, selection of study hypothesis was 
exposed to subjective choices. Fourthly, there may be some market-specific reasons ef-
fecting the findings in this study, i.e. results from Finnish market cannot be generalized 
to other markets. For example, ratio of median acquirer size to target size is 220 in Finland 
and two in Japan (Bris & Cabolis, 2004), which illustrates that there may be some market-
specific factors. However, the results seemed to resemble findings from studies conducted 
in other markets. And finally, there may be some time period -specific factors effecting 
the results, i.e. findings for time period from 2006 to 2009 cannot be generalized to other 
time periods. 
For future research, this study could be expanded to other markets and time periods to 
tackle the limitations regarding markets and time period. Different markets could be com-
pared in relative to returns and other factors, or different merger waves could be exam-
ined. On contrary, other event studies could be replicated with intra-day stock price sam-
ple to capture intra-day returns. Some of transaction-specific factors could be examined 
together, e.g. using cash as a payment method when acquiring a private target or using 
stocks as a payment method when acquiring public target. 
This thesis examined short term returns, so future studies could examine returns in longer 
term, e.g. one year or five years. One approach is to examine strategic rationales behind 
transactions and their effects on returns. Effects of financial performance of acquirer and 
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target can be studied, e.g. revenue or EBIT and their relations. Finally, effects of M&A 
activity on development of financial performance and implications on return could be 
studied.       
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